University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Work

2-2020

Affording Obamacare
Isaac Buck

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Buck, Isaac, "Affording Obamacare" (2020). UTK Law Faculty Publications. 39.
https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs/39

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Work at Legal Scholarship Repository: A
Service of the Joel A. Katz Law Library. It has been accepted for inclusion in UTK Law Faculty Publications by an
authorized administrator of Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law Library. For more
information, please contact eliza.boles@utk.edu.

Affording Obamacare

ev

ISAAC D. BUCK†

iew
ed

Articles

er
r

As it approaches its tenth birthday, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is devolving.
Intended to solve problems that had vexed American health care for generations, the ACA built a
comprehensive structure by providing more Americans with accessible health insurance, reordering
the private insurance market, expanding and reconfiguring Medicaid, and installing rational
incentives into America’s health care enterprise. Without question, it was the most important piece of
health care legislation since the mid-1960s, and it brought about positive change for millions of
Americans.

pe

However, over its short lifespan, the ACA has faced persistent practical, popular, and policy-based
challenges. It remains politically tenuous, with the law’s imperfections fueling an uninterrupted
barrage of legal, administrative, and regulatory attacks, which, piece by piece, have weakened its
overall effectiveness. Instead of installing a comprehensive system, the ACA opted to protect American
patients and beneficiaries from the market’s worst effects without any effective means for cost control.
Its failure to address the cost of health care has continued to haunt it, making it unclear whether it
will fully collapse or whether a mutated version will lumber into the future. Either would be
devastating to the future of American health care. This cost challenge is vividly illustrated by the acute
pain experienced by those who receive insurance through its newly constructed exchanges, where
millions of Americans face rising premiums and deductibles.
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Using lessons from behavioral economics, this Article suggests a reimagining and reordering of the
private ACA marketplace in an effort to put it on a more stable financial footing. Tools from the field
of behavioral economics—relied upon in the federal Medicare program, public health laws, and
employee wellness plans—could be deployed to the ACA marketplaces by creating smarter subsidies
that financially reward the most cost-conscious insurance companies. This would sharpen the
incentive for insurance companies to seek increasing discounts, lowering the price of care. And no
matter the future of the ACA, insights posited here must be part of any future reform effort to address
the cost of American health care—an indispensable, but consistently neglected policy goal.

[261]
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More than eight years after its passage—on December 14, 2018—U.S.
District Court Judge Reed O’Connor declared the entire Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) unconstitutional.1 Legal experts called the decision
an “exercise of raw judicial activism,”2 and “not how judges are supposed to
act.”3 For their part, conservative columnists called it “an assault on the rule of
law,”4 “deplorable,”5 and deserving of reversal.6 No matter its legal
defensibility—which, going into 2020 seems debatable at best, even after a Fifth
Circuit opinion7—Judge O’Connor’s opinion thrusts the ACA into yet another
disruptive and confusing period of uncertainty.8
Texas v. United States is the newest in a long line of judicial, legislative,
administrative, and political threats that have faced the ACA since its creation.9
There was National Federation of Independent. Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) in
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1. Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 619 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
2. Nicholas Bagley, The Latest ACA Ruling Is Raw Judicial Activism and Impossible to Defend, WASH.
POST (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/15/latest-aca-ruling-is-raw-judicialactivism-impossible-defend/?utm_term=.f78cef28f396 (“The logic of the ruling is as difficult to follow as it is
to defend, and it sets the stage for yet another round of high-stakes constitutional litigation over the future of
health care in the United States.”).
3. Jonathan H. Adler and Abbe R. Gluck, What the Lawless Obamacare Ruling Means, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/opinion/obamacare-ruling-unconstitutional-affordable-careact.html.
4. Philip Klein, I Hate Obamacare, but Texas Judge’s Decision on Its Unconstitutionality Is an Assault
on
the
Rule
of
Law,
WASH.
EXAMINER
(Dec.
17,
2018,
11:46
AM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/i-hate-obamacare-but-texas-judges-decision-on-itsunconstitutionality-is-an-assault-on-the-rule-of-law.
5. See Obamacare Needs an Out-of-Court Settlement, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 17, 2018, 6:30 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/12/obamacare-republicans-cant-rely-on-courts-on-health-care/.
6. Id.
7. See Vann R. Newkirk II, What Happens to Obamacare Now, ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/obamacare-remains-despite-judges-ruling-texas/578356/
(“[the] decision rests on three fundamentally controversial and perhaps tenuous interpretations of the law that
may be rejected.”); Will the Supreme Court Save Obamacare Again?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/opinion/trump-obamacare-supreme-court.html?action=click&module
=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage. The Fifth Circuit issued its opinion on December 18, 2019, striking down the
individual mandate, but returning the case to Judge O’Connor to examine severability. See Abby Goodnough,
Obamacare Insurance Mandate Is Struck Down by Federal Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/health/obamacare-mandate.html.
8. See Jenny Deam, ACA Still Law of the Land but Consumers Confused and Worried After Judge’s
Ruling, HOUS. CHRON, https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/ACA-still-lawof-the-land-but-consumers-confused-13469518.php (last updated Apr. 2, 2019, 1:02 PM); Tucker Higgins and
Berkeley Lovelace Jr., States Demand Clarity on Obamacare Ruling Before Friday to Avoid “Chaos,” and Cite
Potential Government Shutdown, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/18/states-demand-clarity-onobamacare-ruling-before-friday-to-avoid-chaos.html (last updated Dec. 18, 2018, 1:37 PM).
9. See Katie Keith, Judge Hears Oral Arguments in Texas v. United States, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept.
10, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180910.861789/full/.
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2012,10 King v. Burwell in 2015,11 the American Health Care Act of 2017,12 and
as many as seventy other total attempts by Congressional Republicans to “repeal,
modify[,] or otherwise curb” it.13 These attempts include, of course, the most
serious legislative threat in the summer of 2017, neutralized only by an emphatic
thumbs-down from ailing Senator John McCain in the middle of the night.14 The
unlikely identities of the law’s rescuers—Chief Justice John Roberts and Senator
McCain—have only added to its broader existential drama.15
And this is not just a story about resistance; some of the punches have
landed.16 There was, most consequentially, the repeal of the individual mandate
penalty in late 2017.17 There have been administrative changes—approaching
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10. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (NFIB). While upholding the individual
mandate as a tax, NFIB made the Medicaid expansion provisions in the ACA voluntary. Id. at 569, 646.
11. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). In King, the Supreme Court upheld the ACA against an attack
based on statutory analysis, upholding the universal availability of tax credits to all markets. Id. at 2495–96.
12. H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted). The American Health Care Act sought to peel back
protections in the ACA and cut Medicaid funding. See id.
13. See Chris Riotta, GOP Aims to Kill Obamacare Yet Again After Failing 70 Times, NEWSWEEK (July
29, 2017, 6:53 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/gop-health-care-bill-repeal-and-replace-70-failed-attempts643832.
14. See Jordan Weissmann, John McCain’s Complicated, Inscrutable Legacy on Obamacare, SLATE (Aug.
26, 2018, 8:05 PM), https://slate.com/business/2018/08/john-mccains-health-care-legacy-did-he-really-saveobamacare.html (“McCain . . . helped rescue the Affordable Care Act twice during 2017.”); see also Lauren Fox,
John McCain’s Maverick Moment, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/28/politics/john-mccain-maverickhealth-care/index.html (last updated July 28, 2017, 3:45 PM); Carl Hulse, McCain Provides a Dramatic Finale
on Health Care: Thumb Down, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/us/johnmccains-real-return.html.
15. See Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2507 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We should start calling this law
SCOTUScare.”).
16. For example, elimination of the individual mandate will cost the system—and American beneficiaries
within that system—more, as admitted by the former Health and Human Services Secretary Tom Price, one of
the acerbic critics of the ACA, in a jaw-dropping statement in the spring of 2018. See Audrey Carlsen & Haeyoun
Park, The Same Agency That Runs Obamacare Is Using Taxpayer Money to Undermine It, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/04/us/hhs-anti-obamacare-campaign.html (“Since being
sworn in as health secretary on February 10, Tom Price has posted on Twitter 48 infographics advocating against
Obamacare, all of which bear the health department’s logo. . . . Once, Mr. Price tweeted five infographics in a
single day.”); Eliza Collins, Former HHS Sec. Price: Repealing the Individual Mandate “Will Harm” People
Insured
Through
Obamacare,
USA
TODAY
(May
1,
2018,
11:21
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2018/05/01/former-hhs-sec-price-repealingindividual-mandate-harm/568281002/ (“‘There are many, and I’m one of them, who believes . . . you’ll likely
have individuals who are younger and healthier not participating in that market, and consequently, that drives
up the cost for other folks within that market,’ Price said during the World Health Care Congress in Washington,
D.C., according to The Washington Times.”); Margaret Hartmann, Trump Shows Commitment to Destroying
Obamacare
by
Picking
Tom
Price
for
HHS,
N.Y.
MAG.
(Nov.
29,
2016),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/11/trump-tom-price-obamacare-hhs.html (“In a speech at CPAC
shortly before the ACA was signed into law, Price said conservatives needed to ‘take our country back’ from ‘a
vile liberal agenda that is threatening everything we hold dear as Americans.’”).
17. See Robert Pear et al., Trump to Scrap Critical Health Care Subsidies, Hitting Obamacare Again, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/trump-obamacare-executive-orderhealth-insurance.html?_r=0 (“Without the subsidies, insurance markets could quickly unravel.”); Margot
Sanger-Katz,
Requiem
for
the
Individual
Mandate,
N.Y.
TIMES (Dec.
21,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/upshot/individual-health-insurance-mandate-end-impact.html.
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what can be called a “synthetic repeal,”18 which include a shortening of the open
enrollment period,19 a cutting of funding for navigators,20 and the ending of costsharing reduction (CSR) payments.21 There have also been other softer-butpotent hostilities to the law—including the public relations assault from the
nation’s chief executive.22 His comments have led to a majority of Americans
holding the belief that the law’s marketplaces are, in fact, collapsing.23 By early
2019, other threats waited like coiled springs.24
But, as these hazards have mounted, a resilient optimism has enveloped the
ACA.25 The ACA is reportedly stabilizing.26 For the first time in its tepid
history,27 public approval of the law has exceeded disapproval for more than one
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18. Michael Hiltzik, Trump Plots Another Backdoor Effort to Gut Obamacare’s Consumer Protections,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017, 10:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-trump-associationsobamacare-20171009-story.html.
19. See Philip Bump, Here’s How the Trump Administration Is Hurting Enrollment in Obamacare, WASH.
POST (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/09/28/heres-how-the-trumpadministration-is-hurting-enrollment-in-obamacare/.
20. See Ken Alltucker, Trump Administration Slashes Funding for Obamacare Outreach Program, USA
TODAY (July 10, 2018, 9:33 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/07/10/obamacare-cutsmean-groups-have-less-sign-up-customers/773728002/.
21. The decision by the Trump administration to end the CSR payments will save the federal government
$10 billion, but will cost it an additional $12.3 billion in increased premium-assistance tax credits in 2018. See
Rabah Kamal et al., How the Loss of Cost-Sharing Subsidy Payments Is Affecting 2018 Premiums, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/how-the-loss-of-cost-sharing-subsidypayments-is-affecting-2018-premiums/; Larry Levitt et al., The Effects of Ending the Affordable Care Act’s
Cost-Sharing Reduction Payments, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.kff.org/healthreform/issue-brief/the-effects-of-ending-the-affordable-care-acts-cost-sharing-reduction-payments/.
22. See Thomas Kaplan, “Let Obamacare Fail,” Trump Says as G.O.P. Health Bill Collapses, N.Y. TIMES
(July 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/us/politics/republicans-obamacare-repeal-now-replacelater.html (noting that President “declared that his plan was now to ‘let Obamacare fail.’”).
23. See Rachel Bluth, Americans Have Mixed Feelings About the ACA’s Future—But Like Their Plans,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 3, 2018), https://khn.org/news/americans-have-mixed-feelings-about-the-acasfuture-but-like-their-plans/ (“[O]nly about one-fifth of people who obtain coverage on the individual market
were even aware that the mandate penalty had been repealed as of 2019, according to the poll.”).
24. See Amy Goldstein, New Insurance Guidelines Would Undermine Rules of the Affordable Care Act,
WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/new-insuranceguidelines-would-undermine-rules-of-the-affordable-care-act/2018/11/29/ff467f46-f357-11e8-aeeab85fd44449f5_story.html?utm_term=.c35db2a36328 (noting that under a new proposal, “states should be free
to redefine the use of those [premium-assistance tax credit] subsidies” and “could allow the subsidies to be used
for health plans the administration has been promoting outside the ACA marketplaces.”).
25. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2018).
26. Sarah Jones, Obamacare Is Still Going Strong, Despite Trump’s Sabotage Campaign, N.Y. MAG. (Nov.
28, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/obamacare-is-still-going-strong-despite-trumps-sabotage.
html.
27. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: The Public’s Views on the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/interactive/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-the-publics-views-on-theaca/#?response=Favorable—Unfavorable&aRange=all (showing support for the ACA exceeding 50% for the
first time in June of 2017).
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year,28 reaching record-high approval in the mid-fifties in early 2018.29 Medicaid
expansion has reached thirty-six states and Washington D.C.30 Ezekiel Emanuel
says that the ACA’s exchanges are “thriving,”31 and Sarah Kliff notes that they
“are having a surprisingly good year.”32 This optimism is reflected at the ballotbox: indeed, the ACA was a winning political issue in the U.S. midterm elections
in 2018.33 And, in the midst of a chaotic attack on its internal gears, federalbased ACA signups slid only four percent during the most recent open
enrollment period—sinking slightly from 8.8 million in 2018, to 8.5 million in
2019.34
While the battle between demise and survival may make for captivating
media narratives, the story of the ACA in 2019 is nuanced. The political
spectacle has obscured the law’s internal weaknesses that put its long-term
sustainability at risk. Nowhere are the ACA’s weaknesses more destructive than
in its so-called marketplaces, the platforms where Americans purchase health
insurance, and where the law is locked in a permanent state of instability due to
a stilted policy design. 35 As a result, the ACA has become unaffordable.
On that marketplace, the ACA’s priority—of expanding access to health
insurance—is made possible by a mix of government payments and government
penalties, private ingenuity and state-based regulation. In simplest terms, under
the ACA, the federal government has been working to constantly shield
Americans from the true cost of their health care, but its financial protection has
not proven universal, and certainly not infinitely durable. As a result, too many
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28. See Jim Norman, Affordable Care Act Gains Majority Approval for First Time, GALLUP (Apr. 4, 2017),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/207671/affordable-care-act-gains-majority-approval-first-time.aspx?g_
source=link_newsv9&g_campaign=item_222734&g_medium=copy.
29. Id. (according to Gallup, approval bounced between 37% and 48% between early 2013 and late 2016;
in April 2017, 55% supported the law); see also Alice Ollstein, Public Approval of Obamacare Hits Record
High
Ahead
of
2018
Midterms,
TALKING
POINTS
MEMO
(Mar.
1,
2018),
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/public-approval-of-obamacare-hits-record-high-ahead-of-2018-midterms.
30. See David K. Jones, The Medicaid Wave, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20181108.484046/full/.
31. Ezekiel Emanuel, The Big Secret About the Affordable Care Act: It’s Working Just Fine, WASH. POST
(Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-big-secret-about-the-affordable-care-act-itsworking-just-fine/2018/10/31/068da248-dd41-11e8-85df-7a6b4d25cfbb_story.html?utm_term=
.893b303bafb5.
32. Sarah Kliff, Obamacare Is Having a Surprisingly Good Year, VOX (Nov. 26, 2018, 4:35 PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/26/18113313/obamacare-mandate-tax.
33. See Sarah Jones, How Obamacare Became a Winning Issue, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/151633/obamacare-became-winning-issue.
34. See Dan Diamond, Facing Oversight, Trump’s ACA Defense Strategy Is Taking Shape, POLITICO (Dec.
20, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-pulse/2018/12/20/facing-oversighttrumps-aca-defense-strategy-is-taking-shape-462043?tab=most-read.
35. Most recently now, twenty states have filed a lawsuit to declare the ACA unconstitutional following
the repeal of the individual mandate. See Erica Teichert, 20 States Sue Federal Government to Abolish
Obamacare, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 26, 2018, 12:00 AM), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/
article/20180226/NEWS/180229931 (“The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ACA in 2012, determining President
Barack Obama’s healthcare reform law was a tax penalty. But the tax cuts signed by President Donald Trump
in December zeroed out the penalty, and the rest of the ACA can’t stand as law without it, according to the
states.”).
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Americans—particularly those who receive no tax subsidies from the
government—remain “unquestionably worse off” under the ACA.36
By seeking to insulate individuals from the cost of their health insurance,
the ACA abdicated any effort to actually bring down the cost of health care—to
actually set prices for MRIs, for example. The government has sought to provide
relief to individuals without addressing the prices of health care. It failed to
spend as much regulatory energy on the cost of the $629 Band-Aid as it did on
subsidies to purchase insurance, for example.37 But without more creative
architecture in these private marketplaces, health care expenditures will continue
to grow faster than Americans’ paychecks. Coupled with a president hostile to
its survival, the ACA’s shields are primed to crack for more and more citizens.38
Health care that is too expensive leads to health insurance that is too
expensive.39 Like a boat taking on water, without a coordinated effort to address
the cost challenge of American health care, the ACA’s glittery access gains seem
precariously wobbly in 2019.40 Using the ACA’s markets—not just to guarantee
shaky health insurance access, but as a cost containment mechanism—remains
an underdeveloped option, both in the literature and in practice. To secure its
survival, the ACA must make private insurance companies prioritize cost control
through new incentives learned from behavioral economics.
This Article sets forth a new frame for conceiving of cost control on the
private market, pushing to bring ideas from behavioral economics and valuebased purchasing onto the ACA’s individual exchange marketplace. Mirroring
other areas of modern health law and policy, the subsidy and compensation
structure on the ACA marketplace could be organized to incorporate shared
savings tools, redirecting incentives so that insurance companies that negotiate
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36. See Julie Rovner, Steep Premiums Challenge People Who Buy Health Insurance Without Subsidies,
NPR (Oct. 7, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/10/07/555957419/steeppremiums-challenge-people-who-buy-health-insurance-without-subsidies.
37. See Sarah Kliff, The Case of the $629 Band-Aid—And What It Reveals About American Health Care,
VOX (May 13, 2016, 8:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/5/13/11606760/emergency-facility-fees-americanhealth-care.
38. See, e.g., Helaine Olen, Even the Insured Often Can’t Afford Their Medical Bills, ATLANTIC (June 18,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/medical-bills/530679/ (“Another study, this one
published in JAMA Oncology, found the price of one month of an oral-cancer medication increased from $1,869
in 2000 to $11,325 in 2014. As insurance companies, desperate to clamp down on their own expenses, cut
reimbursements for the more expensive drugs, and employers, hoping to cut their own costs, push employees
into high-deductible health-insurance plans, more of this cost ends up being picked up by the patients.”).
39. See Jay Hancock and Shefali Luthra, High Deductibles Are Forcing Employees to Pay More Money
Out of Pocket, TIME (Sept. 15, 2016), http://time.com/money/4494938/high-deductible-health-plans-employeecosts/ (noting that, regarding employer-based insurance, “[s]ince 2011, the average deductible for single
coverage has soared 63 percent . . . while workers’ earnings have gone up by only 11 percent.”). “Single
coverage” premiums raised 19% during that same period from 2011 to 2016. See id; see also Olen, supra note
38. Abby Goodnough, As Some Got Free Health Care, Gwen Got Squeezed: An Obamacare Dilemma, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/health/obamacare-premiums-medicaid.html.
40. The insurance rate already likely reached a high-water mark, with the number of insured Americans
likely to drop throughout 2019. See Tami Luhby, 9 Million Fewer Americans Expected to Have Health Insurance
in 2019, CNN (Feb. 26, 2018, 7:47 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/26/news/economy/
obamacare-trump-insurance/index.html.
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the deepest discounts would be rewarded by the most substantial government
subsidies. This shift would seek to address the nagging problem of the price of
health care, and, in contradistinction from other policy solutions, would act on
the insurers and not the insureds on the market, seeking to stabilize either the
ACA or whatever comes next.
This Article will make these arguments in four parts. In Part I, the current
state of the ACA will be documented. In Part II, enduring conflicts of interest
baked into the ACA’s marketplace will be highlighted. In Part III, the field of
behavioral economics, both its doctrinal development and utility in other parts
of health law and policy, will be sketched. Finally, in Part IV, a new shared
savings for insurance companies on the ACA marketplace will be proposed.
I. AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE HANG-UPS

pe
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r

America’s health policy scaffolding reflects a delicate balance between
universality and exclusivity, laws and markets, resulting in fragmented
implementation and political volatility.41 Health care in the country is both an
open public emergency room and the ruthless private insurance marketplace.
America wants both universal and conditional health insurance coverage.42 It
provides generous health care access to sixty-five-year-olds, but charges sixtyfour-year-olds $21,000 for a diagnosis of indigestion.43 It provides coverage for
those living in poverty, but some states—inexplicably—impose premiums on
them.44 It still does not provide health insurance for all, but requires hospitals to
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41. Support for the Affordable Care Act has swung over the last eight years—from a low of 33% support
in November 2013, to a high of 52% in August of 2017. See Ashley Kirzinger et al., Kaiser Health Tracking
Poll—August 2017: The Politics of ACA Repeal and Replace Efforts, KAISER FAM. FOUND. fig.7 (Aug. 11, 2017),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-august-2017-the-politics-of-acarepeal-and-replace-efforts/. Another poll had approval reaching 55% by early 2017. See Norman, supra note 28.
42. See Jonathan Easley, Poll: Majority Supports Single-Payer Health Care, HILL (Sept. 22, 2017, 1:39
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/351928-poll-majority-supports-single-payer-healthcare. See Nicholas
Bagley and Eli Savit, Michigan’s Discriminatory Work Requirements, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/opinion/michigan-medicaid-work-requirement.html
(“Those
in
predominantly white rural counties with high unemployment are exempt from the work requirements. Those in
predominantly black cities with high unemployment are not.”); see also Aaron Blake, Medicaid Work
Requirements Are One of the Least Politically Controversial Things Trump Has Done, WASH. POST (Jan. 11,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/01/11/medicaid-work-requirements-are-oneof-the-least-politically-controversial-things-trump-has-done/?utm_term=.1eaba7b1d067.
43. See Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME MAG. (Apr. 4, 2013),
https://time.com/198/bitter-pill-why-medical-bills-are-killing-us/ (“The bad news was the bill: $995 for the
ambulance ride, $3,000 for the doctors and $17,000 for the hospital—in sum, $21,000 for a false
alarm. . . . Because she was 64, not 65, Janice S. was not on Medicare. . . . It turns out that Medicare would have
paid Stamford $13.94 for each troponin test rather than the $199.50 Janice S. was charged.”).
44. See MaryBeth Musumeci et al., Approved Changes in Indiana’s Section 1115 Medicaid Waiver
Extension, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/approved-changes-inindianas-section-1115-medicaid-waiver-extension/ (“Monthly premiums apply to all beneficiaries from 0-138%
FPL based on income and are at least $1.00.”). Premiums are “tiered,” in that individuals making less than 22%
of FPL (income ranges from $0 to $223 per month) are charged $1.00 per month, whereas individuals making
between 23% and 50% of FPL (income ranges from $223 to $506 per month) are charged $5.00 per month. Id.

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3364502

AFFORDING OBAMACARE

iew
ed

February 2020]

269

er
r

ev

treat all, without regard to ability to pay, in an emergency.45 Impoverished
citizens receive health insurance through the state’s Medicaid program—
assuming they are impoverished—but only for those belonging to one of the
fortressed categories making up the “deserving poor.”46
A complex regulatory structure results because “we are trying to use
markets to distribute something that, at the end of the day, we don’t want
distributed according to market forces.”47 Indeed, health care in America is a
human right,48 a moral cause,49 a foundation for human flourishing,50 and it is a
consumer good,51 a risk pool,52 and a deductible.53 In this view, American health
policy becomes a battle not over how to cure the market, but over when to
appropriately empower and when to properly avoid it.54 The history of health
care policy in America, then, is punctuated by a mix of market-based and
market-eschewing solutions.
In the ultimate transformative opportunity in 2010, America cemented
long-term shortcomings in the individual marketplace.55 The ACA both
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45. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT ACT AND LABOR
ACT (EMTALA), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EMTALA/index (last updated
Mar. 26, 2012).
46. See Annie Lowrey, The People Left Behind When Only the “Deserving” Poor Get Help, ATLANTIC,
(May 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/the-people-who-are-left-behind-whenonly-the-deserving-poor-get-help/528018/. Medicaid has limited its coverage to discrete groups throughout its
history. Id.
47. James Kwak, The Problem with Obamacare, BASELINE SCENARIO (May 9, 2016),
https://baselinescenario.com/2016/05/09/the-problem-with-obamacare/.
48. See Matt Taibbi, Finally Everyone Agrees: Health Care Is a Human Right, ROLLING STONE (June 30,
2017, 5:14 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/taibbi-finally-everyone-agrees-health-care-is-ahuman-right-w490605.
49. See Jack Craver, Most Americans View Health Care as a Moral Issue, BENEFITSPRO (Sept. 9, 2015,
11:54 AM), http://www.benefitspro.com/2015/09/09/most-americans-view-health-care-as-moral-issue; see also
Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Care Coverage, 78 IND. L.J. 659, 672
(2003) (“Moral fairness . . . would forbid abandonment of the sick and disabled.”).
50. See Atul Gawande, Is Health Care a Right?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 25 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/02/is-health-care-a-right (“[The ACA] sever[s] care from our
foundational agreement that, when it comes to the most basic needs and burdens of life and liberty, all lives have
equal worth.”).
51. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete
Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1999) (“Opponents of
regulation . . . typically argue that the free market will more efficiently allocate resources among health care and
other consumer goods than will government mandates.”). But see Lawrence Singer, Health Care Is Not a Typical
Consumer Good and We Should Not Rely on Incentivized Consumers to Allocate It, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 703,
703 (2017) (“Many believe that health care is, or should be treated as, a ‘typical’ economic good.”).
52. What Are “High-Risk Pools” and Do They Lower Health Care Costs?, NPR (May 6, 2017, 7:48 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/06/527140030/what-are-high-risk-pools-and-do-they-lower-health-care-costs.
53. See Russell Korobkin, Health-Care Costs and the “Moral Hazard” Problem, WASH. POST (Mar. 10,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/10/health-care-costs-and-themoral-hazard-problem/?utm_term=.88c212bf2380.
54. See Kwak, supra note 47 (“The dirty not-so-secret of Obamacare, however, is that sometimes the things
we don’t like about market outcomes aren’t market failures—they are exactly what markets are supposed to
do.”).
55. See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Health Care For?, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1689, 1705 (2018) (“Despite being a major federal intervention in health policy, the ACA perpetuated and
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extended (closer to) universal access to its citizenry and stimulated a new private
insurance marketplace, carefully contorting itself to harm the market as little as
possible. The ACA tightened the regulatory screws against insurance companies
but awarded them millions more customers and revenue.56 It outlawed the
exclusion of individuals with preexisting conditions but allowed insurers to price
insurance by zip code, ultimately doing little to bring down the global cost of
health care.57 The law incentivizes insurance companies’ participation—in both
individual and private employer marketplaces58—by heavily subsidizing them
with public funds.59 It genetically engineers an artificial market by propping up
both buyers and sellers.60
But this is nothing new. America’s conflictual health policy development
has followed a simple pattern: legislative solutions that have nobly but languidly
expanded access, have been short on devising solutions designed to contain the
costs of—or, more directly, pay for61—those gains in access. No example of
America’s health care contradiction is more apt than the conspicuously named
Affordable Care Act,62 a law that guarantees access to millions more Americans,
but does little to make the cost of health care any more affordable for the
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entrenched the fragmentation of U.S. health care by expanding the various and very differently structured
healthcare programs already in existence.”).
56. See Sam Baker, How the Authors of Obamacare Protected Insurance Companies, ATLANTIC (Nov. 10,
2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/11/how-the-authors-of-obamacare-protectedinsurance-companies/440853/; Bertha Coombs, As Obamacare Twists in Political Winds, Top Insurers Made $6
Billion (Not that There Is Anything Wrong with That), CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/05/top-healthinsurers-profit-surge-29-percent-to-6-billion-dollars.html (last updated Aug. 6, 2017, 10:16 AM).
57. See Kaiser Calculator Now Gives Consumers 2015 Zip Code-Specific Premium and Tax Credit
Estimates for Marketplace Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.kff.org/healthreform/press-release/kaiser-calculator-now-gives-consumers-2015-zip-code-specific-premium-and-tax-creditestimates-for-marketplace-coverage/.
58. See, e.g., Kate Zernike, The Hidden Subsidy that Helps Pay for Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (July 7,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/health/health-insurance-tax-deduction.html (“[Tax breaks for
employer-sponsored insurance] costs the federal government $250 billion in lost tax revenue every
year . . . [and] economists on the left and the right argue that to really rein in health costs, Congress should scale
back or eliminate the tax exclusion on what employers pay toward employees’ health insurance premiums.”);
see also Health Insurance Marketplace Calculator, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator/.
59. Zernike, supra note 58; see also BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM TAX
CREDITS AND COST-SHARING SUBSIDIES: IN BRIEF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 9 (2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44425.pdf (“For tax year 2014, approximately 3.4 million tax returns indicated
receipt of advance payments of the ACA tax credit, totaling to almost $12 billion.”).
60. Indeed, this market is dependent upon a committed, supportive government to work. The Trump
Administration has shown how important this is to the functioning of the ACA’s individual exchange
marketplaces.
61. See, e.g., William P. Gunnar, The Fundamental Law that Shapes the United States Health Care System:
Is Universal Health Care Realistic Within the Established Paradigm?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 151, 173 (2006)
(noting that “EMTALA represents an unfunded mandate”); Laura D. Hermer, The Scapegoat: EMTALA and
Emergency Department Overcrowding, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 695, 702 (2006) (“Thus, EMTALA’s ‘unfunded
mandate’ becomes a target for providers’ ire in an increasingly pinched system.”).
62. “One of the ACA’s key failings is that, despite its name, it does far too little to make coverage truly
affordable for many economically squeezed Americans.” Josh Mound, How to Win Medicare for All, DISSENT,
Spring 2018, at 23, 24.
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citizenry. Cost-efficiency tools—that rely on deploying markets in a more
targeted and efficient way that could have been activated—were simply left on
the cutting room floor.63
A. THE ACA AS AN ENDURING SPLIT DECISION

pe

er
r

ev

The ACA came on the scene on March 23, 2010 with one main goal: to
increase access to health insurance, and ultimately, health care, for its
populace.64 It accomplished this by (1) initially mandatorily, and then
voluntarily (after NFIB v. Sebelius),65 asking states to expand their Medicaid
programs, and (2) building a private insurance marketplace, known as an
exchange or marketplace, for citizens who lacked health insurance—largely due
to work, financial, or health status—to purchase health insurance with the
assistance of governmental subsidies. These two goals have worked to
drastically lower the number of uninsured individuals.66 They have also shifted
societal norms.67 “Preexisting condition” has become a term firmly ensconced
in public discourse.68 Admirably, and undeniably, the ACA went further to
improve health care access than any federal reform since the Medicare and
Medicaid programs were conceived as part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
Great Society in 1965.69
The balance of this analysis focuses on the newly constructed federal
marketplace. In order to build the marketplace, the federal government required
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63. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
64. The United States still lags behind many other countries on quality and cost measures, largely related
to insurance coverage. See Olga Khazan, What’s Actually Wrong With the U.S. Health System, ATLANTIC (July
14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/07/us-worst-health-care-commonwealth-2017report/533634/ (“The ways to fix these issues . . . are to increase the rate of insurance coverage and access to
primary care, streamline the insurance system so that there are less administrative hurdles for doctors, and funnel
more money toward better nutrition and housing, rather than specialty care.”).
65. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
66. By the end of 2015, more than 19 million Americans had gained health insurance due to the ACA. See
BOWEN GARRETT & ANUJ GANGOPADHYAYA, WHO GAINED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE ACA,
AND WHERE DO THEY LIVE?, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. & URB. INST. 4 (2016),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/86761/2001041-who-gained-health-insurance-coverageunder-the-aca-and-where-do-they-live.pdf.
67. See Kristen Bialik, More Americans Say Government Should Ensure Health Care Coverage, PEW RES.
CTR. (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/13/more-americans-say-governmentshould-ensure-health-care-coverage/ (“Currently, 60% of Americans say the government should be responsible
for ensuring health care coverage for all Americans, compared with 38% who say this should not be the
government’s responsibility. The share saying it is the government’s responsibility has increased from 51% last
year and now stands at its highest point in nearly a decade.”).
68. See Jackie Farwell, Mainers, Here are the Basics on Pre-Existing Medical Conditions, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS (May 10, 2017), http://vitalsigns.bangordailynews.com/2017/05/10/affordable-care-act/mainers-hereare-the-basics-on-pre-existing-medical-conditions/ (“The term is insurance company jargon but it’s quickly
becoming part of the popular lexicon.”).
69. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism” Approach to Medicaid: Empirical Evidence that
Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the States Harms Public Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973, 978 (2002) (“Begun in
1965 as a virtual afterthought to the Social Security Act’s Medicare Program, Medicaid was enacted as a part of
President Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ legislation to provide access to healthcare for America’s poor,
disabled and elderly.” (footnotes omitted)).
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the private individual health insurance market to undertake a grand reorganizing
through dense new regulations, one in which participating insurance companies
consented to cover preventive care services,70 essential health benefits,71 and
individuals with preexisting conditions,72 all while agreeing to abstain from
medical underwriting,73 which had previously allowed insurance companies to
“price in” the amount of risk that each beneficiary represented.74 To sweeten the
deal, the federal government promised to heavily subsidize the new market,75 to
protect the companies from uncertainty,76 and, most importantly, to force
millions of Americans—notably, healthy ones—into the market.77
But what the law did not do was constrict the price of health care on the
front end in any meaningful way.78 Although they were considered, no costconstricting mechanisms were ultimately adopted.79 In other words, the ACA
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70. See Background: The Affordable Care Act’s New Rules on Preventive Care, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND
& MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/preventive-carebackground.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (documenting information about preventive care coverage).
71. See Information on Essential Health Benefits (EHB) Benchmark Plans, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/data-resources/ehb.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2020);
Shelby Livingston, Most ACA Exchange Plans Feature a Narrow Network, MOD. HEALTHCARE, (Dec. 4, 2018,
12:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20181204/NEWS/181209976.
72. See
The
Politics
of
Pre-Existing
Conditions,
WEEK
(Dec.
1,
2018),
https://theweek.com/articles/809983/politics-preexisting-conditions (“The Affordable Care Act . . . bars
insurers from denying coverage or charging higher premiums to individuals with pre-existing conditions.”).
73. See Mark A. Hall, The Competitive Impact of Small Group Health Insurance Reform Laws, 32 MICH.
J.L. REFORM 685, 687–88 (1999) (describing medical underwriting as risk rating applicants based on age and
health status and of deploying practices that limits enrollment of those with preexisting conditions); Sara
Rosenbaum et al., Crossing the Rubicon: The Impact of the Affordable Care Act on the Content of Insurance
Coverage for Persons with Disabilities, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 527, 533 (2011) (describing
underwriting as actuarial rating, which is “a system of pricing insurance premiums based on an individual’s
likelihood of utilizing covered medical care”).
74. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 73, at 533–34.
75. See Explaining Health Care Reform: Questions About Health Insurance Subsidies, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-health-care-reformquestions-about-health/.
76. See Cynthia Cox et al., Explaining Health Care Reform: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk
Corridors, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaininghealth-care-reform-risk-adjustment-reinsurance-and-risk-corridors/ (“The program worked by cushioning
insurers participating in exchanges and marketplaces from extreme gains and losses.”).
77. Questions and Answers on the Individual Shared Responsibility Provision, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/individuals-and-families/questions-and-answers-on-the-individualshared-responsibility-provision (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). The individual mandate has since been repealed. See
Robert Pear, Individual Mandate Now Gone, G.O.P. Targets the One for Employers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/us/politics/employer-mandate.html.
78. Prices continue to rise. See Brad Tuttle, Here’s What’s Happened to Health Care Costs in America in
the Obama Years, TIME (Oct. 4, 2016), http://time.com/money/4503325/obama-health-care-costs-obamacare/.
79. See Helen A. Halpin and Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the Public Option, 29 HEALTH
AFF. 1117, 1119 (2010), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0363 (noting that the
public option was “omitted” from the final legislation adopted that would become the Affordable Care Act).
Nonetheless, the public option has been in and out of the public consciousness during health policy debates since
2010. See, e.g., Hillary Clinton, My Vision for Universal, Quality, Affordable Health Care, NEW ENG. J.
MEDICINE (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsb1612292 (“And finally, we need to
ensure the availability of a public option choice in every state, and let Americans over 55 buy in to Medicare.”);
see also Reed Abelson and Margot Sanger-Katz, The Health Care “Public Option” Is Back. Can It Help
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does not tell pharmaceutical companies or hospitals how much to charge for
certain services, nor does it adequately empower America’s payers to
aggressively negotiate; instead, it seeks to insulate Americans from painful
expenditures. As a result, the ACA’s popularity and effectiveness are largely
impacted by two factors: (1) how many additional people have achieved health
insurance access because of its provisions; and (2) how expensive and
burdensome those insurance plans—and the concomitant care that accompanies
those plans—are for these new beneficiaries. On this second factor, this is where
the architecture of the marketplace has become paramount.

pe
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Reading the public statements that accompanied its passage in 2010, one
would think that the ACA represented the “end of history”80 for America’s
journey toward universal access to health care for its citizens. Before the final
House vote on the ACA, Speaker Nancy Pelosi—who, more than any other
legislator, deserves praise for its passage81—said “[t]oday we have the
opportunity to complete the great unfinished business of our country.”82 Indeed,
as has been said, it may have been “the most important event of the Obama
presidency.”83
President Obama was less sanguine. “This legislation will not fix
everything that ails our health care system, but it moves us decisively in the right
direction,” he said upon its passage.84 In a statement striking for its multiple post
hoc translations—both conveying the gravity of the moment and recognizing the
incremental nature of its reform—Obama noted that “[t]his is what change looks
like.”85 Vice President Joe Biden was less measured, but surely more colorful.86
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Obamacare?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/upshot/the-health-carepublic-option-is-back-can-it-help-obamacare.html (noting that, in 2010, the public option “was a no-go even
with Democratic control of both branches [of Congress] in 2010”); Mara Gay, Why Lieberman Hates the Public
Option, ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2009), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/10/why-lieberman-hatesthe-public-option/347740/ (“The public option was on a roll. Then, on Tuesday, Sen. Joe Lieberman threatened
to filibuster the health care bill if it includes a public option, which he says would create ‘trouble for taxpayers,
for the premium payers and for the national debt.’”). The election of the Scott Brown to the Senate in
Massachusetts served as “a death blow to the public option.” Bob Cusack et al., The Chaotic Fight for
ObamaCare, HILL (Feb. 10, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/268877-the-chaotic-fight-forobamacare.
80. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) (arguing that liberal
democracy could signify the end of “ideological evolution,” or the “end of history”).
81. See Cusack et al., supra note 79.
82. See Karen Tumulty, Making History: House Passes Health Care Reform, TIME (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1973989,00.html.
83. See David Blumenthal et al., The Affordable Care Act at Five Years, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2451, 2451
(2015), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMhpr1503614.
84. See Tumulty, supra note 82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. Ewen MacAskill, Barack Obama’s Healthcare Bill Passed by Congress, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2010,
3:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/22/us-healthcare-bill-passes-congress.
86. See Brian Montopoli, Biden Swears at Bill Signing: Just Biden Being Biden?, CBS NEWS (Mar. 23,
2010, 2:18 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-swears-at-bill-signing-just-biden-being-biden/
(describing Vice President Biden as telling President Obama that “passage of the bill is a ‘big [fucking] deal’”).

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3364502

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

iew
ed

274

[Vol. 71:261

er
r

ev

And regarding structural access to health care, Biden was right: the ACA
has been a game-changer.87 It has ushered in rapid changes to America’s
complex health insurance system. Millions of Americans have gained access to
insurance through massive expansions,88 accomplished both by (1) Medicaid
expansion and (2) the individual exchange, in which federal government-funded
tax subsidies and cost sharing reduction payments help citizens pay for health
insurance and care.89 The law has been “surprisingly resilient,”90 perhaps most
tellingly on the score of health care insurance coverage, even after regulatory
changes brought about by the Trump administration shrunk the number of
insured Americans,91 and made health insurance both more expensive and harder
to find.92 More recent proposals from the Trump administration will likely
continue this trend.93
On perhaps its most important metric, by just the third year of the ACA’s
implementation, the American uninsurance rate had dropped to 10.3% of the
U.S. population.94 This was a stark change from the historic uninsurance rate for
the two decades preceding the ACA’s passage, during which the rate had reliably
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87. See generally GARRETT & GANGOPADHYAYA, supra note 66 (offering an overview on the positive
change the ACA has brought).
88. Id. at 7.
89. See Linda Qiu, Calling Cost-Sharing Reduction Payments “a Bailout” Is Misleading, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/us/politics/cost-sharing-reductions-bailout.html; John Ydstie,
How the Affordable Care Act Pays for Insurance Subsidies, NPR (Nov. 7, 2013, 2:57 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/11/07/243584170/how-the-affordable-care-act-pays-forinsurance-subsidies.
90. Peter Sullivan, ObamaCare Proves Surprisingly Resilient, HILL (Dec. 25, 2017, 5:57 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/366239-obamacare-proves-surprisingly-resilient; see also Harold Pollack,
Republicans Couldn’t Kill Obamacare. That’s the Genius of Its Design., WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/03/29/republicans-couldnt-kill-obamacare-thatsthe-genius-of-its-design/?utm_term=.d421a6699c6d (“And in doing so, it has quietly embedded itself within the
fabric of American life—and has become very difficult for politicians to kill.”).
91. Nonetheless, the changes were not as impactful as originally feared. See National ACA Marketplace
Signups Dipped a Modest 3.7 Percent This Year, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/press-release/national-aca-marketplace-signups-dipped-a-modest-3-7percent-this-year/.
92. Id. (noting that more than 11.7 million Americans signed up for health insurance on the ACA exchange,
“amid steep reductions in federal funding for outreach and navigators, an enrollment period half as long, and a
climate of political uncertainty surrounding the law”).
93. See Margot Sanger-Katz, A Big Divergence Is Coming in Health Care Among States, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/upshot/health-care-obamacare-states-divergence.html (“Taken
together, experts say, the administration’s actions will tend to increase the price of health insurance that follows
all the Affordable Care Act’s rules and increase the popularity of health plans that cover fewer services. The
result could be divided markets, where healthier people buy lightly regulated plans that don’t cover much health
care, lower earners get highly subsidized Obamacare—and sicker middle-class people face escalating costs for
insurance with comprehensive benefits.”).
94. Key Facts About the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://www.kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/ (this uninsurance rate
amounts to about 28 million people).
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hovered between 16% and 18% of the population.95 In an access battle that had
been fought for generations,96 the ACA made real headway.
Of course, most of the heaviest lifting was accomplished by the relentlessly
battered Medicaid program.97 By November of 2018, thirty-six states and the
District of Columbia—a high-water mark98—had expanded their workhorse
Medicaid programs under the ACA,99 additionally insuring a total of more than
11 million beneficiaries.100 By the end of 2018, only fourteen states—
concentrated in the southeast and central plains—had not expanded Medicaid.101
Largely driven by its expansion under the ACA, by the end of 2017,
Medicaid covered approximately 74 million beneficiaries—up from about 57
million before the ACA was passed.102 As of 2018, more than 20% of Americans
received insurance through Medicaid, and, judging from public polling and
various other developments, this number may yet grow in the future.103 Vitally,
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95. Id.
96. Health care access was slowly extended to more and more groups of Americans since the advent of
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. See, e.g., Eligibility, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMMISSION,
https://www.macpac.gov/medicaid-101/eligibility/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (“Between 1984 and 1990,
however, Congress made a number of changes that expanded Medicaid for pregnant women and children.”).
97. The American Health Care Act—the bill that passed the Republican-led House of Representatives—
would have installed a per capita cap on the safety net program. See Julia Paradise, Restructuring Medicaid in
the American Health Care Act: Five Key Considerations, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/restructuring-medicaid-in-the-american-health-care-act-five-keyconsiderations/.
98. Medicaid expansion is cheaper for the federal government than paying for premium-assistant tax
credits for the ACA’s individual exchange. See Susannah Luthi, ACA Subsidies Cost More Per Person Than
Medicaid.
Is
that
Sustainable?,
MOD.
HEALTHCARE
(Aug.
8,
2018,
1:00
AM),
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180808/NEWS/180809915 (“The CBO’s latest projection from
earlier this year show government paying out an average of $6,300 annually for every subsidized enrollee in
fiscal 2018. It estimates that number will rise to nearly $12,500 in 2028. In contrast, Medicaid spends $4,230
per non-disabled adult, set to inflate at 5.2% annually to just over $7,000 per person in 2028.”).
99. Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decision: Interactive Map, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 20, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-theaffordable-care-act/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%
22asc%22%7D.
100. See Leighton Ku et al., Data Note: Medicaid’s Role in Providing Access to Preventive Care for Adults,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 17, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/data-note-medicaids-role-inproviding-access-to-preventive-care-for-adults/.
101. See Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decision: Interactive Map, supra note 99.
102. Total Monthly Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 2019),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/total-monthly-medicaid-and-chipenrollment/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%2
2%7D.
103. See Joel Ebert & Dave Boucher, Behind Closed Doors, Haslam Asks Again: Can Tennessee Expand
Health Care for Working Poor?, TENNESSEAN, https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/
2018/04/13/can-tennessee-expand-health-care-working-poor-haslam-asks-behind-closed-doors/511878002/
(last updated Apr. 13, 2018, 2:52 PM; Mallory Noe-Payne, Medicaid Expansion in Virginia Inches Closer to
Reality, WVTF (Apr. 6, 2018), http://wvtf.org/post/medicaid-expansion-virginia-inches-closer-reality; Texans
Want to Expand Medicaid. Politicians Don’t, HOUS. CHRON. (Sept. 14, 2018, 4:47 PM),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Texans-want-to-expand-Medicaid-Politicians13228093.php.
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expanding coverage for the Medicaid population is likely to translate into
increases in the amount of individuals receiving preventive care.104
The ACA has made the most progress in states that have implemented the
Medicaid expansion and supported their individual private health insurance
exchanges. For example, California’s uninsured rate had dropped from 17%
before the implementation of the ACA to 6.8% during the middle of 2017.105
After the first few years of the ACA, Illinois’ uninsured population had shrunk
from 1.6 million to just 817,000.106 Large swaths of Oregon, Nevada, New
Mexico, southern Colorado, southwest Texas, and Arkansas have shown doubledigit jump in health insurance rates since its passage.107
In addition to broadening access to health insurance, the ACA also
deepened the quality of health insurance coverage. The ACA made preventive
care and chronic disease treatment—in addition to a number of other
treatments—available to millions of Americans.108 Under the law, nongrandfathered insurance plans cover—without any cost sharing—a number of
preventive cancer screenings, chronic condition screenings, immunizations,
counseling services, pre-natal screenings and supports, and contraception and
reproductive health screenings and counseling.109
The ACA reformed the individual marketplace from the inside-out, adding
to the number of plans with comprehensive coverage. Most notably, the ACA
prohibited annual and lifetime limits for health insurance plans,110 outlawed
preexisting conditions,111 and banned medical underwriting.112 In a noteworthy
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104. See Miguel Marino et al., Receipt of Preventive Services After Oregon’s Randomized Medicaid
Experiment, 50 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 161 (2016) (“[T]his study demonstrates a causal relationship
between Medicaid coverage and receipt of several preventive services in CHC patients, including receipt of
breast and cervical cancer screenings as well as screenings for BMI, blood pressure, and smoking, during a threeyear follow up.”).
105. See Cathie Anderson, California’s Uninsured Rate Drops to New Low, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 21,
2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/health-and-medicine/article185812078.html.
106. See Lisa Schencker, Illinois Uninsured Rate Falls Again—But for How Long?, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 12,
2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-health-insurance-coverage-increases-0913-biz-20170912story.html.
107. See Kevin Quealy and Margot Sanger-Katz, Obama’s Health Law: Who Was Helped Most, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 29, 2014) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/29/upshot/obamacare-who-was-helpedmost.html.
108. Key Facts About the Uninsured Population, supra note 94.
109. Preventive Services Covered by Private Health Plans Under the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Aug. 4, 2015) https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/preventive-services-covered-by-privatehealth-plans/.
110. Lifetime & Annual Limits, HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-theaca/benefit-limits/index.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2017).
111. Pre-Existing Conditions, HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-the-aca/preexisting-conditions/index.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2017).
112. Gary Claxton et al., Pre-Existing Conditions and Medical Underwriting in the Individual Insurance
Market Prior to the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 12, 2016) https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issuebrief/pre-existing-conditions-and-medical-underwriting-in-the-individual-insurance-market-prior-to-the-aca/
(“Prior to 2014 medical underwriting was permitted in the individual insurance market in 45 states and DC.”).
See Hall, supra note 73 (noting that medical underwriting is risking rating applicants based on age and health
status and of limiting enrollment of those with preexisting conditions).
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regulatory provision, the ACA also strictly limited the profits that health
insurance companies can pocket on the exchanges through medical-loss ratio
regulations.113
2.

Cost Expenditure Growth
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It is a well-worn refrain by now: American health care is too expensive.114
The country spends $3.6 trillion annually on health care, which amounts to
$11,172 per person.115 It now accounts for 17.7% of the gross domestic product
(GDP).116 And it will continue to grow in stature. American health expenditures
are forecasted to hit $6 trillion, and nearly 20% of the GDP, by 2027.117 America
spends more, on average, than any other peer country.118 Indeed, the trends are
certainly worsening. The United States’ gap in health care spending—between
it and every other country—has precipitously widened over the last 50 years.119
The ACA’s ability to positively impact the cost of American health care
has been “mixed.”120 From a global perspective, the growth of national health
expenditures rose with the implementation of the ACA, and then slowed in
2016.121 In 2016, both “the federal government and households accounted for
the largest shares of health care spending,” each responsible for 28% of overall
health care expenditures.122
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113. Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 29, 2012)
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/explaining-health-care-reform-medical-loss-ratio-mlr/.
114. See Austin Frakt, Medical Mystery: Something Happened to U.S. Health Spending After 1980, N.Y.
TIMES (May 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/upshot/medical-mystery-health-spending1980.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=image&module=second-columnregion&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news. Recent work has suggested that America’s health care cost
spending became anomalous—as compared to other countries—starting in 1980. Id.
115. See National Health Expenditure Data: Historical, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (last updated Dec. 17, 2019).
116. Id.
117. See National Health Expenditure Projections 2018–2027, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.
(Feb.
20,
2019),
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/ForecastSummary.pdf.
118. See Bradley Sawyer and Cynthia Cox, How Does Health Spending in the U.S. Compare to Other
Countries?,
PETERSON-KAISER
HEALTH
SYS.
TRACKER
(Dec.
7,
2018)
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-spending-u-s-comparecountries/?_sf_s=health+spending#item-start. Switzerland, the second-highest-spending country, allocates
$8009 per person annually on health care. Id. Third-place Germany spends just over $5700—roughly half of
what the United States spends. Id. The United Kingdom spends only $4246 annually; the “comparable country
average” of other first-world countries surveyed totals around $5280. Id.
119. See id.
120. See Tuttle, supra note 78.
121. See Micah Hartman et al., National Health Care Spending in 2016: Spending and Enrollment Growth
Slow After Initial Coverage Expansions, 37 HEALTH AFF. 150, 151–52 (2017) (showing that national health
expenditures grew 4.1% in 2010, 3.5% in 2011, 4.0% in 2012, 2.9% in 2013, 5.1% in 2014, 5.8% in 2015, and
4.3% in 2016). The “faster growth in 2014 and 2015 is associated with coverage expansions under the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) and strong retail prescription drug spending growth.” Id. at 150.
122. Id. at 154.
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A recent study showed that out-of-pocket expenditures dropped nearly
12% following the increases in insurance coverage, but “premium
contributions” increased by 12%.123 Individuals earning more than 400% of the
federal poverty level have faced as much as a 23% increase in premiums in the
two years since ACA implementation.124 These are individuals, thanks to the
ACA’s subsidy structure, who face the entirety of cost premium increases.125
Clearly, these numbers indicate that the law has benefitted the poorest
Americans—reducing their out-of-pocket spending by more than 21%—but
caused “middle-income households [to see] a 28 percent jump in high-burden
premium spending,”126 leading the study’s lead author to note that the ACA has
“reduced out-of-pocket costs,” but failed to “stem the steady rise in families’
premiums,” and “there is plenty of room for progress.”127 Further, “out-ofpocket spending by consumers on health costs not covered by insurance rose 3.9
percent [in 2016] compared with 2.8 percent in 2015.”128
Regarding the individual market, those signing up for health insurance on
the health insurance exchange have been subject to repeated premium jumps. In
Tennessee, for example, carrier BlueCross BlueShield requested a 62% average
increase in 2017 and 21% average increase in 2018.129 Cigna requested a 46%
increase in 2017 and a 42% increase in 2018.130 A third carrier, Humana,
requested a 44% increase in 2017, and exited the markets in 2018.131
Although subject to a number of uniquely-affecting characteristics,
premiums—for silver plans on the ACA exchanges—have recently made
headlines because they are decreasing.132 But other plans’ premium increases—
undoubtedly impacted by regulatory and enforcement changes brought about by
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123. Anna Goldman et al., Out-of-Pocket Spending and Premium Contributions After Implementation of the
Affordable Care Act, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 347, 348 (2018).
124. See Dan Mangan, Out-Of-Pocket Health Spending Dropped by Nearly 12 Percent—But Premiums Rose
After Obamacare Roll Out, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/22/out-of-pocket-health-spending-droppedafter-obamacare-rolled-out.html (last updated Jan. 22, 2018, 3:20 PM). In 2018, 400% of federal poverty level
for a family of two is approximately $66,000 per year, and for a family of four, it is about $100,000 of annual
income. See Federal Poverty Guidelines, FAMILIES USA, (July 2018) https://familiesusa.org/product/federalpoverty-guidelines.
125. See infra notes 189–202 and accompanying text.
126. Mangan, supra note 124.
127. Id.
128. See Toni Clarke, U.S. Healthcare Spending Growth Slowed in 2016, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2017, 1:07 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-report/u-s-healthcare-spending-growth-slowed-in-2016idUSKBN1E031D.
129. See Holly Fletcher, Tennessee’s ACA Market “Even Less Secure” After Failed Repeal, Insurance Chief
Frets, TENNESSEAN, https://www.tennessean.com/story/money/industries/health-care/2017/07/28/mcpeakquestions-congressional-shore-up-aca-market-after-repeal-defeat/520001001/ (last updated July 28, 2017, 4:34
PM).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Rachel Fehr et al., How ACA Marketplace Premiums Are Changing by County in 2019, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/how-aca-marketplace-premiumsare-changing-by-county-in-2019/.
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the Trump administration—are substantial.133 For example, for the 2018 market,
a carrier in Georgia requested an average rate increase of 34.5%,134 one in
Maryland requested one at more than 45%,135 multiple Michigan carriers
requested increases ranging from 13% to about 27%,136 respectively, New
Mexico’s carriers requested increases of 21%, 33%, and 49%,137 respectively,
and one in Virginia requested an increase of 21.5 percent, with another
requesting an increase above 54%.138 According to Kaiser:

ev

Looking back to 2014 . . . reveals a wide range of premium changes. In many
of these cities, average annual premium growth over the 2014-2018 period
has been modest, and in two cities . . . benchmark premiums have actually
decreased. In other cities, premiums have risen rapidly over the period,
though in some cases this rapid growth was because premiums were initially
quite low.139
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For 2018, the premium shift for benchmark silver plans was expected to
range from negative 5% to 49% across twenty-one major American cities.140
Nonetheless, according to a 2017 HHS report, the “average individual market
premiums more than doubled from $2,784 per year in 2013 to $5,712 on
healthcare.gov in 2017.”141 Three states saw their average premiums triple from
2013 to 2017.142
This trend may continue. In the spring of 2018, early reporting on
preliminary premium increases for 2019 indicated that “insurers requested hikes
as high as 64.3 percent” in Virginia, about 11% in Vermont, and about 11% in
Maryland.143 One plan in Maryland reportedly listed a 91.4% premium
increase.144 But some markets are expected to stabilize, likely resulting in
smaller premium increases.145
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133. See Rabah Kamal et al., An Early Look at 2018 Premium Changes and Insurer Participation on ACA
Exchanges, KAISER FAM. FOUND., (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issuebrief/an-early-lookat-2018-premium-changes-and-insurer-participation-on-aca-exchanges/.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Further, the number of participating insurers has changed, decreasing from nearly seven in 2015 to
4.6 in 2018. Id. See Fehr et al., supra note 132 (noting the number of insurance companies participating by state
has decreased).
139. See Kamal et al., supra note 133.
140. Id.
141. See HHS Report: Average Health Insurance Premiums Doubled Since 2013, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (May 23, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/05/23/hhs-report-average-healthinsurance-premiums-doubled-2013.html.
142. Id. The three states were Alaska, Alabama, and Oklahoma, according to the Department of Health and
Human Services. Id.
143. Catherine Rampell, This Is What a Death Spiral Looks Like, WASH. POST (May 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/this-is-what-a-death-spiral-looks-like/2018/05/14/07cea4cc-57b311e8-8836-a4a123c359ab_story.html.
144. Id.
145. See Jessica Seaman, As Colorado’s Insurance Market Stabilizes, Officials Expect Premium Increases
to
Be
Lower
Than
Years’
Past,
DENVER
POST
(Dec.
18,
2018),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/12/18/colorado-insurance-market-premiums/; see, e.g., Kristi L. Nelson,

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3364502

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

iew
ed

280

[Vol. 71:261

pe

er
r

ev

Indeed, tax subsidies on the individual marketplace insulate the typical
consumer from feeling the worst effects of those price increases.146 As the
National Conference of State Legislatures noted, the average increase before
subsidies was a shocking 25%.147 These increases have improved profitability
for insurance companies, increasing the monthly gross margins per member.148
But premium calculations are only one side of the equation; deductibles of
the individual exchange plans have risen while the networks of coverage have
narrowed.149 In 2018, the average deductible for an ACA exchange silver plan
was $3937, an increase from $3703 in 2017, even though bronze plan
deductibles were decreasing.150 Nonetheless, “the reality is, the American
insurance system is designed to make health care financially unpleasant, often
to the point where patients forgo necessary care.”151 Relatedly, “90 percent of
all people on the exchanges still pay deductibles in excess of $1,300 individually
or $2,600 per family, amounts that are often difficult to afford even for middleclass families.”152
Financial discomfort has not been limited to the individual marketplace.
Similar premium price increases are present in employer-based health insurance,
with the average cost of an “employer-sponsored family plan” totaling $12,680
in 2008, and rising to $18,142 by 2016.153 The average worker was responsible
for $3354 in premium costs in 2008, and in 2016, the average worker was
responsible for premium amounts at $5277.154 More than half (51%) of survey
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Obamacare: Lower ACA Premiums, More Options Likely for Tennesseans in 2019, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL
(July 12, 2018, 5:16 PM), https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/health/2018/07/12/obamacare-tennesseelower-premiums-aca-2019/779414002/ (noting a reduction in premiums for 2019 individual exchange
proposals).
146. See Rampell, supra note 143 (“Most exchange enrollees will be shielded from premium increases
thanks to income-based subsidies, and despite Democratic fever dreams, voters don’t seem all that motivated by
health care.”).
147. Health Insurance: Premium and Increases, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 4, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-insurance-premiums.aspx.
148. See Cynthia Cox et al., Individual Insurance Market Performance in 2018, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May
7, 2019), https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/individual-insurance-market-performance-in-2018/
(“On average, premiums per enrollee grew 26% from 2017 to 2018, while per person claims grew only 7%.”).
149. See Dan Mangan, Obamacare Plans Get More Restrictive and Deductibles Get Pricier in 2018, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/30/obamacare-plans-get-narrower-and-deductibles-get-pricier-in-2018.html
(last updated Nov. 30, 2017, 4:31 PM).
150. Id.
151. Vann R. Newkirk II, The American Health-Care System Increases Income Inequality, ATLANTIC (Jan.
19, 2018) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/health-care-income-inequality-premiumsdeductibles-costs/550997/ (“The ACA helped reduce total bankruptcies by as many as 1.5 million between 2010
and 2017. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that, between 2011 and 2016, the percentage
of Americans with trouble paying medical bills dropped precipitously.”).
152. Id.
153. See Tuttle, supra note 78; see also Average Annual Workplace Family Health Premiums Rise Modest
3% to $18,142 in 2016; More Workers Enroll in High-Deductible Plans with Savings Option over Past Two
Years, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Average Annual Workplace Family Health Premiums
Rise] https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press-release/average-annual-workplace-family-health-premiums-risemodest-3-to-18142-in-2016-more-workers-enroll-in-high-deductible-plans-with-savings-option-over-past-twoyears/.
154. See Tuttle, supra note 78.
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respondents reported that their health insurance deductibles exceeded $1000.155
This cost is up from 16% in 2006 and 35 percent in 2008.156 Relatedly, 83% of
those employed reported that their single coverage carries a deductible, and its
average amount is $1478.157 In 2015, the average deductible for the same type
of insurance was $159 less, and in 2011, it was $486 less.158
Nonetheless, the 2016 data could very well paint a brighter picture. Survey
results from 2016 indicated that between 2011 and 2016, health care insurance
family premiums rose 20%, which “reflect[ed] a significant slowdown,” as
premiums rose 31% from 2006 to 2011, and 63% from 2001 to 2006.159 Further,
according to President Barack Obama’s White House, increases in premiums are
much lower than they would have been without the passage and implementation
of the ACA.160 In short, the White House argued that
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Structural changes in the health care system . . . reduced health care spending
growth relative to the past. . . . It is therefore increasingly likely that
structural changes in the health care system—including changes in public
policy and other factors that would have a persistent effect on health care
spending over the long run—are the primary reasons health care cost growth
remains low today.161
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Finally, it has been argued that, as the deductible rate has risen, the “share
[families in employer coverage] bear in the form of co-payments and coinsurance has actually fallen steadily in recent years.”162
Other works have acknowledged the fact that provisions within the ACA
have “thus far yielded modest cost savings” and that the law has not ushered in
a “return to the double-digit increases of the past.”163 Nonetheless, “little
evidence” has been found to support the idea “that ACA cost containment
provisions produced changes necessary to ‘bend the cost curve.’”164 Indeed, at
least two major trends complicate the data: (1) the years leading up to the
implementation of the ACA were impacted by the 2007–2009 recession;165 and
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155. See Average Annual Workplace Family Health Premiums Rise, supra note 153.
156. See Tuttle, supra note 78.
157. See Average Annual Workplace Family Health Premiums Rise, supra note 153.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Jason Furman & Matt Fiedler, New Data Show that Premium Growth in Employer Coverage
Remained
Low
in
2016,
WHITE
HOUSE
BLOG
(Sept.
14,
2016,
12:00
PM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/09/14/new-data-show-premium-growth-employer-coverageremained-low-2016, noting:

rin

Sustained slow premium growth is generating major benefits for families. Had premium growth since
2010 matched the average rate recorded over the preceding decade, the average total premium for
employer-based family coverage would have been nearly $3,600 higher in 2016. A large portion of
these savings have accrued directly to workers in the form of lower premium contributions.
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161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Janet Weiner et al., Effects of the ACA on Health Care Cost Containment, U. PA. LEONARD DAVIS
INST. HEALTH ECON. ISSUE BRIEF (Mar. 2, 2017), https://ldi.upenn.edu/brief/effects-aca-health-care-costcontainment.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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(2) the crush of additional insurance coverage in 2014 resulted in a substantial
number of new beneficiaries.166 Both trends obscure a cleaner causal story
regarding the ACA’s ability to contain the cost of American health care. It seems
uncontroversial to assert that whether or not the ACA has been “good” for cost
containment is subject to one’s individual circumstances; nonetheless, it has
surely not drastically improved the prices of American health care by reversing
cost increases.
B. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT
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In February 2018, it was the stony stare of thirty-year-old Gwen Hurd, set
against melting snow and beneath a blaring New York Times headline, that
communicated an unmistakable message.167 Hurd’s story—facing a 60%
premium increase for its health insurance plan, her family turned to the ACA
exchange,168 where she and her husband could only find a plan with a monthly
premium of $928 and a $6000 deductible169—is all-too-familiar for millions of
Americans who continue to struggle.170 The glare, the snow, the weathered fence
behind her, all of it,171 personify the persistent headwinds that continue to
hamper the ACA.
So do the words of Teri Goodrich and her husband, John Kistle.172
Goodrich and Kistle, private consultants in their late fifties, were paying $1600
per month in health care premiums and facing deductibles of $7500 each before
dropping their ACA-purchased insurance altogether.173 They are now “trying to
figure out how to make less than $64,000 so [they] can get subsidies.”174 One
could also add the story of Karen Poulter, a middle-aged biologist, who pays
premiums totaling more than $600 per month—in addition to her $400 out-ofpocket prescription drug costs.175 Her deductible is $4000.176 She gets no federal
tax help either.177
The Goodriches and Poulters of the world—representative of about 2.1
million Americans who have purchased non-subsidy assisted ACA
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166. Id.
167. Goodnough, supra note 39.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Rovner, supra note 36.
171. After toying with the idea of dropping their insurance, the feature ends with Ms. Hurd fortunately
finding a new job that offered her health insurance with a $300 monthly premium, avoiding the worst effects of
an “Obamacare dilemma.” Goodnough, supra note 39. Nonetheless, the plan carried a $3000 individual
deductible and a $6000 deductible for her family. Id.
172. See Rovner, supra note 36.
173. Id.; see also supra notes 167–171 and accompanying text.
174. See Rovner, supra note 36.
175. See Dan Mangan, Obamacare’s Crushing Cost to Some Families: 49 Percent Price Hike Since 2014,
Premiums of $14,300, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/11/these-folks-dont-get-obamacare-subsidiesnow-and-it-is-really-costing-them.html (last updated May 11, 2017, 6:05 PM).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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coverage178—may constitute a burning edge of the ACA.179 They do not fit into
the positive narrative of the ACA that has finally shown up in public polling of
the law180—its sparkling access expansions,181 health equity gains,182 and muchneeded financial protections.183 In short, the stories of Hurd, Goodrich, Kistle,
and Poulter—representing insufficient insulation from the worst of the private
market—illustrate the most potent long-term existential challenge for the ACA.
To be fair, the ACA’s architects would be quick to note that Americans
who receive health care on the individual exchanges—this year, an enrollment
that approached 12 million Americans184—receive tax subsidies to defray the
costs of health insurance.185 For the majority of Americans receiving premium
assistance tax credits on the marketplace, most Americans avoid the full pain of
rising premiums.186 In the last couple of years, between 83% and 85% of
Americans who had signed up on the ACA exchange for health insurance
received a tax subsidy to dull the pain of the insurance premium increases187—
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178. See Rovner, supra note 36.
179. See Mangan, supra note 175 (“She’s echoed by Karen Poulter, a 51-year-old molecular biologist from
California, who this year saw her health insurance premium jump 20 percent. She now pays almost $618 per
month for a plan that has a $4,000 deductible and—because of health problems that include migraines and
endometriosis—her prescription drug costs out-of-pocket are about $400 each month.”).
180. The law has finally experienced an extended period—since the spring of 2017—where the public’s
favorability of the ACA outpaces its unfavorability. See Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: The Public’s Views on the
ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.kff.org/interactive/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-thepublics-views-on-the-aca/#?response=Favorable—Unfavorable.
181. See Kevin Griffith et al., The Affordable Care Act Reduced Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Care
Access, HEALTH AFF. BLOG, https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2017.0083 (last visited Jan. 24,
2020).
182. For instance, the Affordable Care Act has had an undeniably positive impact on the lives of those living
with HIV/AIDS. See The Affordable Care Act Helps People Living With AIDS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/policies/aca.html (last updated Feb. 15, 2019).
183. See Annie Lowrey, The Bankruptcies that Would Follow an Obamacare Repeal, ATLANTIC (July 25,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/health-care-financial-protection/534762/ (“[T]he
Affordable Care Act saved her not just from cancer, but from financial ruin.”).
184. See Abby Goodnough, The Final Obamacare Tally Is In. About 400,000 Fewer People Signed Up This
Year, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/health/obamacare-enrollmentinsurance-trump.html.
185. See Troy Griggs et al., How Many People Are Affected by Obamacare Premium Increases? (Hint, It’s
Fewer Than You Think), N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/09/
us/politics/who-is-really-affected-by-rising-obamacare-premiums.html.
186. See THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM,
CONG. BUDGET OFF. 14 fig.5 (2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
43768_DistributionTaxExpenditures.pdf ; see also Joseph Antos, End the Exemption for Employer-Provided
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/14/the-worst-tax-breaks/end-theexemption-for-employer-provided-health-care (last updated Dec. 6, 2016, 11:29 AM) (“Premiums paid for
employer-sponsored health insurance are excluded from taxable income, reducing the amount workers owe in
income and payroll taxes by about $250 billion annually.”).
187. Notwithstanding the Trump administration’s decision to end different cost-sharing reduction (CSR)
payments, the premium assistance tax credit subsidies do defray the cost of monthly insurance premiums for
beneficiaries. See Pear, et al., supra note 17. In fact, in 2015, for those registering on healthcare.gov, “tax credits
averaged $263 a month and reduced the premium by 72 percent, on average.” See Robert Pear, 86 Percent of
Health Law Enrollees Receive Subsidies, White House Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/us/11-7-million-americans-have-insurance-under-health-act.html.
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technocratic analgesics unavailable to Hurd and her family, which, perhaps
unsurprisingly, tends to breed resentment.188
Nonetheless, the ACA’s individual marketplace treats individuals in
different income brackets radically different. Tightly calibrated, the exchange is
heavily subsidized, with low earners being awarded the largest subsidies. The
subsidy structure is a wonkish marvel, applying a sliding scale in an attempt to
meet individuals in very different socioeconomic realities in different places.
But the ACA’s subsidy structure has jagged cliffs. For example, based
upon projections, a married couple with a $60,000 household income seeking
health insurance on the exchange would receive $979 per month in subsidies and
pay $478 per month out-of-pocket for insurance premiums.189 The same couple
with a $70,000 household income would receive no federal tax subsidy, and
would have to pay approximately $1457 per month in premiums.190 As a result,
the couple making $60,000 would pay $5736 annually in health care premiums;
the couple making $70,000 would pay $17,484. In effect, the lower-earning
couple would come out on top after health care premiums were paid.
This fragmentation prompts helplessness,191 resentment,192 and
frustration,193 among those who have seen drastic premium increases:

pe

“Obamacare helped me,” Ms. Griffith said. “I had a pre-existing condition,
could not get insurance and had to pay cash, nearly $30,000, for the birth of
my first baby in 2010. For my second pregnancy in 2015, I was covered by
Obamacare, and that was a huge financial relief.” But the costs for next year,
she said, are mind-boggling. She and her husband, both self-employed,
expect to pay premiums of $32,000 a year for the cheapest Optima plan
available to their family in 2018. That is two and a half times what they now
pay Anthem. And the annual deductible, $14,400, will be four times as high.
“I have no choice,” Ms. Griffith said. “I agree that we need to make changes
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Indeed, in the individual market, if the animating principle of the ACA is the drive to adequately shield
beneficiaries from the full force of their insurance premium increases, the ACA seems to be working. See
Newkirk II, supra note 151 (noting that some of the ACA’s implemented policies “have been able to do some
shielding”).
188. See id. Mangan, supra note 175.
189. See Health Insurance Marketplace Calculator, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator-2018/.
190. Id.
191. See Robert Pear, Middle-Class Families Confront Soaring Health Insurance Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/us/politics/obamacare-premiums-middle-class.html.
192. See Julie Rovner, Overlooked By ACA: Many People Paying Full Price for Insurance “Getting
Slammed,” KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 9, 2017), https://khn.org/news/overlooked-by-aca-many-peoplepaying-full-price-for-insurance-getting-slammed/ (“We’re getting slammed. We didn’t budget for this.”); see
also Goodnough, supra note 39 (“‘It seems to me that people who earn nothing and contribute nothing get
everything for free,’ said Ms. Hurd, 30. ‘And the people who work hard and struggle for every penny barely end
up surviving.’”); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Sorry, We Don’t Take Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/sunday-review/sorry-we-dont-take-obamacare.html (“Yet even as many
beneficiaries acknowledge that they might not have insurance today without the law, there remains a strong
undercurrent of discontent.”).
193. See, e.g., Catherine Keefe, I’m an Obama Supporter. But Obamacare Has Hurt My Family, WASH.
POST (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/posteverything/wp/
2014/12/10/im-an-obama-supporter-but-obamacare-has-hurt-my-family/.
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in the Affordable Care Act, but we don’t have time to start over from scratch.
We are suffering now.”194
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People who are not assisted by the subsidies are those most directly
financially affected by the spiraling cost of American health care, and, those
effects are painful.195
But what makes the pain worse is that not everyone—even those in a
nearby socioeconomic neighborhood—is experiencing it.196 The cutoffs
between various financial cadres of households reflects state line-drawing.197
Ms. Hurd exemplifies resentment that results when she says, “I’m totally happy
to pay my fair share . . . but I’m also paying someone else’s share, and that’s
what makes me insane.”198 What is true, of course, is that forcing most
Americans to pay their “fair share” for their health care would be completely
unsustainable.
But the perception of unfairness persists because so many others are getting
assistance.199 Whether these beliefs are right or wrong, decent or indecent,200 it
is true that the ACA did focus its most robust protection on those lower on the
socioeconomic ladder, and, where a societal good is priced in such a way that
many Americans have trouble paying for it, this surely can breed resentment
against the law.201 That the support of the law from those without tax subsidy
insulation—those facing the worst of the market—has undoubtedly curdled,
underscores the importance of rebuilding the market to better take account of the
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194. Pear, supra note 191.
195. Id.
196. See Sarah Kliff, Why Obamacare Enrollees Voted for Trump, VOX (Dec. 13, 2016, 8:10 AM),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/12/13/13848794/kentucky-obamacare-trump.
197. See John C. Goodman, Six Problems with the ACA That Aren’t Going Away, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June
25, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20150625.048781/full/ (“A family of four at 138
percent of poverty is able to enroll in Medicaid in about half the states and obtain insurance worth about $8,000.
Since the coverage is completely free, that’s an $8,000 gift. If they earn one dollar more, they will be entitled to
go into a health insurance exchange and obtain a private plan that costs, say, 50 percent more in return for an
out-of-pocket premium of about $900. That’s a gift of more than $11,000.”).
198. Goodnough, supra note 39.
199. Id.; see also Tami Luhby, Why So Many People Hate Obamacare, CNN (Jan. 6, 2017, 10:45 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/05/news/economy/why-people-hate-obamacare/index.html (“Please show me
where in the Constitution it says that the government should ‘promote the general welfare’ by stealing from half
the population to give to the other half.”).
200. See Caitlin Dewey, White America’s Racial Resentment Is the Real Impetus for Welfare Cuts, Study
Says, WASH. POST (May 30, 2018), https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.washingtonpost.com/
amphtml/news/wonk/wp/2018/05/30/white-americas-racial-resentment-is-the-real-impetus-for-welfare-cutsstudy-says/ (“White Americans called for deeper cuts to welfare programs after viewing charts that showed they
would become a racial minority within 50 years. . . . Researchers have also shown that white Americans’ racial
prejudice affects their views on everything from healthcare policy to the death penalty to dogs.”).
201. In this way, the ACA played in to the 2016 presidential election in astounding ways. See generally
ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN
RIGHT (2016) (exploring the connection between emotional decision making and the 2016 presidential election
in the United States); Jason DeParle, Why Do People Who Need Help From the Government Hate It So Much?,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/25/books/review/strangers-in-their-own-landarlie-russell-hochschild.html (“What unites her subjects is the powerful feeling that others are ‘cutting in line’
and that the federal government is supporting people on the dole—‘taking money from the workers and giving
it to the idle.’ Income is flowing up, but the anger points down.”).
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system’s underlying costs. Additional challenges—for example, the cost of the
tax-subsidy system in relation to Medicaid expansion—further highlights the
need for an immediate solution to the cost problem.202
II. THE MARKET’S STRUCTURAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
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That the ACA empowered private insurance companies to provide health
insurance through the ACA exchanges—private, profit-driven, margin-obsessed
private corporations with heavy government regulation and dual subsidies—
reflects notable, if not curious, policy architecture, mainly because the federal
government and America’s private insurance companies share an immiscible
conflict of interest. One has sought, prominently through the ACA, to expand
access to insurance and care, whereas the other, to remain viable, has to limit
access to that care. Instead of trying to protect beneficiaries by directly
regulating the cost of care on the front end, and in lieu of negotiating with health
insurers, the government wrote it a blank check. This structure highlights a
challenge for the ACA’s architecture and explains why the ACA is unable to
squeeze the cost of health care.
Health insurance, by its nature, operates as a risk-spreading mechanism.203
For an insurance company to increase its profits, it has to collect more in
premiums than it pays out in claims.204 It can accomplish this goal in one of two
ways: it can either increase premiums or cut payouts, either through establishing
discounts with providers and hospitals or through constricting the types of
treatments and procedures it will cover. In fact, survival and success of its
business model depends upon its beneficiaries not accessing health care—and
specifically not accessing expensive health care.
This point is worth underscoring: it is not simply that health insurance
plans are ambivalent as to whether or not their beneficiaries access health care,
but insurance companies are dependent upon a number of their beneficiaries not
accessing care in a given year. Their profit depends upon limiting access to
care.205 Indeed, what made uninsured Americans unable to access health
insurance before the ACA’s passage—from a market perspective—was the fact
that those potential beneficiaries were unprofitable for insurance companies to

Pr

ep

rin

202. See Susannah Luthi, ACA Subsidies Cost More Per Person than Medicaid. Is that Sustainable?, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Aug. 8, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180808/NEWS/
180809915.
203. See Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What’s Insurance Got to Do with It? Recognizing Health
Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 436, 437 (2010); Dayna Bowen Matthew,
Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health Insurance: Of Markets, Courts, and a
Regulatory Quagmire, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1043 (1996) (“Group health insurance is less expensive
to obtain and administer than individual insurance due to risk spreading and economies of scale.”).
204. See Mariner, supra note 203, at 446–47 (noting that insurance companies “have a financial incentive
to retain as much of the premiums as possible by paying fewer benefits”).
205. See Seth D. Ginsberg, Five Ways Insurance Companies Meddle in Your Health Care, U.S. NEWS (July
13, 2017), https://health.usnews.com/health-care/for-better/articles/2017-07-13/5-ways-insurance-companiesmeddle-in-your-health-care (noting that insurers can become more profitable by “limiting coverage for certain
treatments and passing expenses on to customers”).
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cover.206 Thus, the ACA had to make these beneficiaries profitable enough for
insurance companies to cover them on the individual marketplace, ultimately
coaxing companies to participate in the market altogether. And that is one of the
reasons why the ACA was such a notable accomplishment.
A. COOPERATIVE CORPORATISM
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The ACA has built a structure that is reliant on what can be called
cooperative corporatism. The functionality of the market depends upon whether
insurance companies—the same corporations that are required to maximize
shareholder value and profits—are willing to participate and offer plans on the
highly-regulated exchanges.207 If they want the markets to succeed, therefore,
the federal government and state insurance commissioners throughout the
country have little power to push insurance companies to hold down their price
increases year-over-year because, of course, they are reliant on the insurance
companies agreeing to continue to participate in the markets.208 Insufficient
profits mean no market.
As a result, instead of the federal government holding leverage over
insurance companies, the ACA’s markets have been organized the other way
around. The government becomes an involuntary partner to the price increases,
having no ability to challenge them,209 but on the hook for funding them.
Corporate appeasement, needless to say, is a disastrous cost control policy.
Additionally, in this way, the ACA’s individual market functions nearly
directly opposite to the way of the most efficient health care systems around the
world. In other systems, most of the pricing leverage is on the side of the
government payer, allowing the state to effectively hold down the price of health
care.210 In the United States under the ACA, however, the state has too little
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206. See Gene B. Sperling & Michael Shapiro, How the Senate’s Health-Care Bill Would Cause Financial
Ruin
for
People
with
Preexisting
Conditions,
ATLANTIC
(June
23,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/ahca-senate-bill-preexisting-conditions/531375/ (noting
that repealing the ACA would reinstall “a system in which companies often profited not by how well they
provided healthcare but by how well they discriminated against or screened out those who faced the most
challenges”); Jordan Weissmann, Trump Has Brought Back the Kind of Junk Health Insurance that Obamacare
Was Meant to Ban, SLATE (Aug. 1, 2018, 5:51 PM), https://slate.com/business/2018/08/trump-has-broughtback-the-type-of-junk-health-insurance-that-obamacare-was-meant-to-ban.html (“Routing young, healthy
insurance shoppers away from the Obamacare exchange will skew that market further towards sick, unprofitable
patients, forcing carriers to raise their prices in order to make a profit.”).
207. See Shelby Livingston, Insurers Won’t Commit to 2018 Exchanges Until They Know ACA’s Future,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 3, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20170203/NEWS/170209984.
208. See, e.g., Jim Galloway, State Insurance Commissioner Okays Massive Premium Hikes on ACA
Exchanges, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/stateinsurance-commissioner-okays-massive-premium-hikes-aca-exchanges/Ol9XJwHNCzYpSiCyPt1KjN/; Paula
Wissel, Health Insurance Premiums for Individuals Could Rise by 19 Percent In Washington, KNKX SEATTLE
(June 5, 2018), https://www.knkx.org/post/health-insurance-premiums-individuals-could-rise-19-percentwashington.
209. Id.
210. See Jerome Groopman & Pamela Hartzband, Putting Profits Ahead of Patients, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July
13,
2017),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/07/13/putting-profits-ahead-of-patients/
(“Many
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leverage in its attempts to ensure insurance companies participate in the
markets211—to say nothing of its ability to impact the pricing of those plans.212
B. SYMBIOTIC PRICING
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Called “arguably one of the most effective tools the White House has to
hold down premium costs,” and the “Obamacare provision that terrifies
insurers,”213 the Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) within the ACA was gloriously
hailed as an indispensable policy tool that would ensure that “consumers [were]
receiving a higher return on their premium dollars.”214 Writing in 2011 before
NFIB, it was also asserted that it would “ultimately, lead to the death of large
parts of the private, for-profit health insurance industry.”215 Housed within the
sprawling ACA,216 the MLR was intended to “limit supposedly wasteful and
self-serving spending by insurers.”217 Specifically, the MLR works by limiting
“the portion of premium dollars health insurers may spend on administration,
marketing, and profits,”218 and mandating that “insurers must spend at least 80
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industrialized nations, including Germany, Japan, Belgium, and others, have uniform negotiated national fee
schedules for hospital admissions and clinical encounters with doctors.”); Katie Thomas, The Fight Trump Faces
over Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/health/the-fight-trumpfaces-over-drug-prices.html (noting that Canada and Britain have systems that feature “leverage with many
multinational drug corporations” and that “[t]heir government-run health programs are the only game in town
and hold significant power in setting drug prices.”); see also Why Is Health Care So Expensive?, CONSUMER
REP. (Sept. 2014) https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2014/11/it-is-time-to-get-mad-about-theoutrageous-cost-of-health-care/index.htm (stating that Medicare “is by far the largest single source of revenue
for most health care providers, which gives it more leverage to set prices.”).
211. See Olga Khazan, Why So Many Insurers Are Leaving Obamacare, ATLANTIC (May 11, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/05/why-so-many-insurers-are-leaving-obamacare/526137/.
212. See Holly Fletcher, Tennessee Insurance Commissioner: Obamacare Exchange “Very Near Collapse,”
TENNESSEAN
(Aug.
23,
2016),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/money/industries/healthcare/2016/08/23/insurers-get-approval-for-2017-obamacare-rates/89196762/ (noting that the Tennessee
Insurance Commissioner signed off on rate increases of 62%, 46%, and 44% respectively, for the health
insurance exchange in 2017, largely because “[t]he rate approvals . . . were necessary to ensure healthcare
options in every part of Tennessee when open enrollment beg[an] in November”).
213. Sarah Kliff, The Obamacare Provision That Terrifies Insurers, WASH. POST (July 18, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/07/18/the-obamacare-provision-that-terrifiesinsurers/?utm_term=.c3052c24840b.
214. David Hudson, The “80/20 Rule” Is Saving Americans a Lot of Money. But What Exactly Is It?, WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (July 24, 2014, 3:39 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/07/24/8020-rulesaving-americans-lot-money-what-exactly-it.
215. Rick Ungar, The Bomb Buried in Obamacare Explodes Today—Hallelujah!, FORBES (Dec. 2, 2011,
3:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2011/12/02/the-bomb-buried-in-obamacare-explodes-todayhalleluja/#ccf9c0a4fab6.
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 158.210 (2019) (referring to “[m]inimum medical loss
ratio”).
217. Sally Pipes, HHS Can Target Obamacare’s Medical Loss Ratio Rule Right Away, FORBES (Apr. 17,
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sallypipes/2017/04/17/hhs-can-target-obamacares-medical-lossratio-rule-right-away/#b7a850973220.
218. Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), supra note 113.
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percent of their premium revenue on medical care and quality improvement.”219
For large-group insurers, the companies must spend at least 85%.220
The remaining 20% (or 15% for large-group insurers)221 of each dollar
collected via premiums can be allocated to “pay overhead expenses, such as
marketing, profits, salaries, administrative costs, and agent commissions.”222
Insurance companies that miss the required MLR must provide rebates to its
beneficiaries.223 Due to its importance, a battle front quickly opened between
insurance companies and regulators over how to appropriately define what
counted as a medical or quality improvement service.224
There is no doubt that the MLR saved American beneficiaries a lot of
money. According to the Obama White House, the MLR prevented consumers
from paying what would have amounted to an estimated additional $9 billion in
premiums from 2011 to 2013.225 Even after the markets were fully functioning,
it has continued to save beneficiaries money. According to Kaiser, in 2015, a
total of nearly 1.2 million beneficiaries received MLR rebates totaling $107.3
million.226 The regulatory floor that the ACA’s MLR provision imposed
undoubtedly improved the financial efficiency of health insurance.227
But, while it limits what health insurers can charge, it does not limit overall
price increases. Indeed, mandating a certain level of efficiency for health
insurers and reducing the overall cost of American health care are two separate
aims. The MLR, while noble in its goals and “relatively easy” to understand in
terms of its vague cost control intentions,228 ensures that the premiums American
beneficiaries pay are more tightly tied to the cost of their health care. But the
MLR does nothing to hold down the cost of their health care at the outset.
Worse, the MLR may not only be neutral on the cost control question, but,
stunningly, may actually harm global cost control efforts, blunting the natural
incentive of insurance companies to strenuously negotiate with providers and
hospitals in efforts to hold down the costs of health care. Under an MLR, a health
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219. Julie Appleby, Final Medical Loss Ratio Rule Rebuffs Insurance Agents, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec.
2, 2011), https://khn.org/news/final-medical-loss-ratio-rule-rebuffs-insurance-agents/.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/medical-lossratio-mlr/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
223. See
Medical
Loss
Ratio,
CTRS.
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/Medical-LossRatio.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
224. The Gaming Begins, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/24/opinion/
24mon2.html.
225. See Hudson, supra note 214.
226. See Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Rebates in the Individual Market for Consumers and Families, KAISER
FAM.
FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/mlr-rebates-individual-market/
?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last
updated Nov. 15, 2018).
227. See Kliff, supra note 213 (noting that, prior to the ACA MLR, some individual health insurance plans
“would spend as little as 60 percent on medical costs”).
228. Id.
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insurance company—the only actor in the health care delivery system that is
purportedly incentivized to hold down the cost of health care—actually hurts
itself more by vigorously holding down price increases because its profits are
limited to a percentage of premiums collected. Lower health care prices lead to
smaller profits. No matter how you slice it, 20% of a smaller pie is a smaller
number.
Put another way, an insurance company that wishes to grow its profit—not
the percentage of profit it is allowed to pocket in the marketplaces, but the gross
amount of profit—is incentivized to raise its premiums. Because there is no limit
on the amount premiums can increase on an annual basis, there is a limit on the
percentage of profit an insurance company can pocket. There is a simple solution
for the insurance company seeking to grow its profits: raise prices, or, at least
avoid spirited negotiations with health systems and providers in which the
insurance company seeks to limit cost growth in the system. In effect, then, the
MLR blunts the most powerful cost control impulses of the insurance
companies, whose officers, by the way, have fiduciary duties to maximize
company profits for their shareholders.229
There is a clear response to this concern: in the private marketplace,
insurance companies that fail to hold down premium increases effectively will
lose customers. And, like in any private marketplace, those insurance companies
that can limit their year-over-year premium increases will be rewarded in the
individual marketplace by growing market share. After all, no one wants to pay
for a health insurance plan that inadequately negotiates with providers; as a
result, those insurance plans that inflate prices (or allow their prices to grow) in
an effort to increase their profits will be damaged when consumers flee their
plans because of the cost of their premiums.
But that response ignores three important details about the health insurance
marketplace that all demonstrate that it is unlike any other typical market.
Specifically, (1) the health insurance market is under-competitive; (2) the health
insurance consumer is not price-sensitive; and (3) increasingly saturated healthcare provider markets have already flipped leverage in the provider-insurer
relationship. Relying on the consumer to prevent the worst excesses of the ACA
private exchange market is ineffective.
Like an annual ritual, substantial hand wringing has occurred around the
concern that whole counties will soon lack an ACA exchange insurer.230 Even
though it has not yet happened,231 the number of counties with just one
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229. See ELISABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS: HOW HEALTHCARE BECAME BIG BUSINESS AND
HOW YOU CAN TAKE IT BACK 18 (2017) (“WellPoint’s first priority appear[ed] no longer to be its
patient/members or even the companies and unions that [chose] it as an insurer, but instead its shareholders and
investors.”).
230. See Haeyoun Park & Audrey Carlsen, For the First Time, 45 Counties Could Have No Insurer in the
Obamacare Marketplaces, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/09/
us/counties-with-one-or-no-obamacare-insurer.html.
231. See Dylan Scott, There Are No More Counties Without Any Obamacare Plans, VOX (Aug. 24, 2017,
4:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/health-care/2017/8/24/16199620/voxcare-no-counties-without-obamacare.
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participating insurer has been striking.232 In fact, in 2018, a majority of counties
in the individual marketplace (52% of all counties)—nonetheless representing
where about 26% of enrollees live—had one participating insurer on the ACA
marketplace.233 This percentage is lower than originally projected,234 but a
marketplace with only one participating insurer is not a competitive
marketplace. A sole competitive insurer can raise prices with impunity. Given
anemic competition, any “profit-share penalty” for raising premiums—a typical
deterrent for sellers in other marketplaces—is severely blunted.
In addition to insurance companies’ failure to represent a typical seller’s
market, beneficiaries shopping for an individual health insurance plan are not
true consumers in any typical sense.235 Again, the majority of beneficiaries
receive subsidies that cover the majority of their health insurance costs,236
weakening their drive to be price-discriminating consumers. Whether or not
beneficiaries have enough “skin in the game” is a topic that has garnered
scholarly attention.237 However, notwithstanding the perfect calibration of
consumer “pain,” any subsidy that helps the many beneficiaries purchasing plans
on the ACA individual market lessens the pressure on beneficiaries to be
naturally price-discriminating. A consumer who enjoys the fact that more than
80% of one’s bill is being covered by the federal government cannot possibly
mimic a true consumer.
Finally, insurance companies that do not strenuously negotiate, while being
more attractive to providers and hospitals, may also—as a byproduct of being
weaker negotiators—actually make their products more attractive by offering
larger networks to the beneficiaries who sign up for their plans. If the insurance
company is less concerned about aggressively having to attract customers to
purchase its plan while also being more dependent on premium assistance tax
credits from the federal government, it is less worried about holding down its
prices, which makes it more attractive to hospitals and doctors who wish to
increase their prices. In this way, the MLR within the ACA may actually be
incentivizing insurance companies to allow providers and hospitals to raise
prices faster than they otherwise would.
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232. See Ashley Semanskee et al., Insurer Participation on ACA Marketplaces, 2014–2018, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/insurer-participation-on-acamarketplaces/2881/.
233. See id. (showing that the entire states of Kentucky, Delaware, Alaska, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Iowa,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Arizona, and Wyoming, and a clear majority of counties in Missouri, North Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and North Dakota had only one insurer in 2018).
234. See Khazan, supra note 211 (“The fact that one-third of counties are projected to have just one insurer
on their Obamacare exchanges this year has been a popular talking point among Republicans—including
President Trump—trying to gin up support for their replacement bill, the American Health Care Act.”).
235. See Paul Krugman, Patients Are Not Consumers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/22/opinion/22krugman.html (“The idea that all this can be reduced to
money—that doctors are just ‘providers’ selling services to health care ‘consumers’—is, well, sickening.”).
236. See supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Christopher Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin Back in the Health
Care Game, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 921 (2013).
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In an easy jump, financial pain, socioeconomic chafing, and unbridled
resentment can very easily slide into political degradation. The truth is the ACA
has not enjoyed clear public support since its implementation. This, among other
characteristics, has been a particularly troublesome feature of a law that many
policy experts thought would be popular.238 That it took a direct frontal assault
in early 2017 to finally pull the law over 50 percent approval should be telling.239
Unsurprisingly, polling on removing the individual mandate penalty was split
nearly completely in half in early 2017.240 This, of course, has continued to place
its long-term stability at risk, and has led Republicans to strive to repeal
president Obama’s signature piece of legislation for the better part of a
decade.241
This resentment is not without political costs.242 Reporting after the 2016
election, Sarah Kliff found that “[m]any expressed frustration that Obamacare
plans cost way too much, that premiums and deductibles had spiraled out of
control. And part of their anger was wrapped up in the idea that other people
were getting even better, even cheaper benefits—and those other people did not
deserve the help.”243
The law is not threatened only by political degradation, but also regulatory
degradation. The government’s decision to link the expansion in access to an
expansion and reordering of the private insurance marketplace creates a
regulatory conflict of interest. Because the government is both committed to
expanding the number of individuals who have insurance and responsible for
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238. See Ezra Klein, Obamacare’s Most Popular Provisions Are Its Least Well Known, WASH. POST (Mar.
22, 2013, 10:01 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/03/22/obamacares-most-popularprovisions-are-its-least-well-known/?utm_term=.9a208d0c79f8 (“The argument of Obamacare’s advocates has
always been that it will become more popular in 2014, when it begins rolling out its benefits. . . . But pressing
against that prediction is the fact that it will also become less popular as implementation leads to lots of stories
about where the law is failing and what it could be doing better.”).
239. See Norman, supra note 28.
240. See Jennifer Agiesta, CNN/ORC Poll: Public Splits on Revoking Individual Mandate, CNN (Mar. 7,
2017, 7:31 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/politics/health-care-replacement-poll/index.html.
241. See Juliet Eilperin et al., Senate Republicans’ Effort to “Repeal and Replace” Obamacare All But
Collapses, WASH. POST (July 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/trump-suggestsrepublicans-will-let-aca-market-collapse-then-rewrite-health-law/2017/07/18/5e79a3ec-6bac-11e7-b9e22056e768a7e5_story.html?utm_term=.afd8438f3baf (noting a “seven-year quest” to repeal the law).
242. See Sarah Kliff, Why Obamacare Enrollees Voted for Trump, VOX (Dec. 13, 2016, 8:10 AM),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/12/13/13848794/kentucky-obamacare-trump. On this point, one
of the individuals Kliff spoke to in Kentucky said the following:
“They can go to the emergency room for a headache,” she says. “They’re going to the doctor for
pills, and that’s what they’re on.” She felt like this happened a lot to her: that she and her husband
have worked most their lives but don’t seem to get nearly as much help as the poorer people she
knows. She told a story about when she used to work as a school secretary: “They had a Christmas
program. Some of the area programs would talk to teachers, and ask for a list of their poorest kids
and get them clothes and toys and stuff. They’re not the ones who need help. They’re the ones getting
the welfare and food stamps. I’m the one who is the working poor.”
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regulating—and theoretically, penalizing—insurance plans that deviate from the
strictures of the ACA’s rules, it may be the case that one interest inextricably
conflicts with the other. For instance, if the government’s interest in adequately
policing the individual exchange marketplace shrinks the number of plans for
sale on those exchanges, it ultimately harms its goal in achieving universal
coverage through supporting and protecting robust marketplaces.
III. TEN YEARS OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
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Ten years after its original insights,244 behavioral economics has surely
come to the law—even health law.245 A field credited to Cass Sunstein and
Richard Thaler,246 behavior economics study has been described as “economics
done with strong injections of good psychology.”247 The field’s “core insight”
lays on the realization that “human beings do not always act in [their] own longterm best interests,”248 and that individuals “have limited cognitive abilities and
a great deal of trouble exercising self-control.”249 Further, people are
“profoundly influenced by context, and often have little idea of what they will
prefer next year or even tomorrow.”250 These insights encourage choice
architects and policymakers to consider the construction of various “nudges,”
which are intended to encourage decision-makers to make better “prosocial”
decisions.251
The contributions of Sunstein and Thaler are evidenced by their bestselling
book,252 Nudge, published in 2008.253 These insights have been used to influence
law and policy development, seeking to build structures that lead to better
individual decision-making and, ultimately, better policy outcomes, without
legal compulsion. As such, the field of behavioral economics has been an
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244. See Nudge Turns 10: A Special Issue on Behavioral Science in Public Policy, BEHAV. SCIENTIST (Sept.
4, 2018), http://behavioralscientist.org/nudge-turns-10-a-special-issue-on-behavioral-science-in-public-policy/
(“Since 2008, these units, and researchers and policymakers with an eye for applying behavioral science in
government, have influenced everything from tax policy to retirement savings, from energy consumption to
environmental responsibility.”).
245. See, e.g., NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds.,
2016) [hereinafter NUDGING HEALTH] (offering an overview of behavioral science in health law).
246. Thaler won the Nobel prize in 2017 for his work on behavioral economics. See David Halpern,
“Behavioural Economics” May Sound Dry— But It Can Change Your Life, GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2017, 11:23
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/10/behavioural-economics-richard-thaler-nudgenobel-prize-winner.
247. David Gal, Why Is Behavioral Economics So Popular?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/opinion/sunday/behavioral-economics.html.
248. Jessica L. Roberts, Nudge-Proof: Distributive Justice and the Ethics of Nudging, 116 MICH. L. REV.
1045 (2018) (observing distributional concerns caused by the practice of “nudging”).
249. Shahram Heshmat, What Is Behavioral Economics?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 3, 2017),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/science-choice/201705/what-is-behavioral-economics.
250. Id.
251. Roberts, supra note 248, at 1047.
252. See Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, GOODREADS,
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/3450744-nudge (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
253. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
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important tool in recent discourse surrounding the future of legal regulation. One
contribution of Sunstein and Thaler that has been particularly influential has
been their work around libertarian paternalism.254

ev

Drawing on some well-established findings in behavioral economics and
cognitive psychology, we emphasize the possibility that in some cases
individuals make inferior decisions in terms of their own welfare—decisions
that they would change if they had complete information, unlimited cognitive
abilities, and no lack of self-control. . . . Libertarian paternalism is a
relatively weak and nonintrusive type of paternalism, because choices are not
blocked or fenced off. In its most cautious forms, libertarian paternalism
imposes trivial costs on those who seek to depart from the planner’s preferred
option. But the approach we recommend nonetheless counts as paternalistic,
because private and public planners are not trying to track people’s
anticipated choices, but are self-consciously attempting to move people in
welfare-promoting directions.255
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Recent writing has suggested that individuals prefer such “nudges” that
rely on “statistical information and factual disclosures” largely “on the
assumption that they show greater respect for individual autonomy and dignity
and promote individual agency” more than nudges that are not “educative and
which target or benefit from automatic processing.”256
Nonetheless, the insights made by Sunstein and Thaler have been imported
into health law and policy, as “[p]eople often make decisions in health care that
are not in their best interest.”257 Expanding horizons beyond traditional hard law
tools, health policy and public health experts have increasingly explored and
deployed softer incentives based on new understandings of human behavior.258
These efforts may either reward actors who advance public aims, penalize those
who fail to achieve them, or—more simply—seek to improve decision-making
from independent actors. One of the upsides of these softer regulatory
interventions is the avoidance of command and control mandates from the state.
A. MODERN POLICY “NUDGES” IN HEALTH LAW
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Drawing on lessons in other areas of health law that have adopted more
targeted interventions, the ACA’s individual marketplace could be more
intentional about health care “nudges.”259 Indeed, as currently constructed,
health insurance companies are not encouraged to think about the long-term
impacts of rising premiums, nor are they incentivized to undertake cost-saving
efforts that are directly contradictory to their profit goals. Recent examples of
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254. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003).
255. Id. (footnotes omitted).
256. Cass R. Sunstein, People Prefer System 2 Nudges (Kind of), 66 DUKE L.J. 121, 123 (2016).
257. Thomas Rice, The Behavioral Economics of Health and Health Care, 34 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 431,
431–32 (2013) (“Indeed, many of the most vexing problems facing individuals and society as a whole in health
care are neither medical nor scientific in nature; they are behavioral.”).
258. See NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 245.
259. See Alan M. Garber, Can Behavioral Economics Save Healthcare Reform?, in NUDGING HEALTH,
supra note 245, at 27.
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the increasing deployment of tools from behavioral economics within health law
and policy—soft pressures that encourage particularized decision-making, or
push decision-makers to just be more deliberative—are illustrative.
1.

Consumers and Employees: Soft Efforts
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Soft efforts that seek to improve individual decision-making can be found
prominently in the public health sphere. A legitimate primary policy goal of a
state—a healthier populace—leads to policymaking that seeks to encourage
citizens to make healthier decisions.260 But by employing science on decisionmaking, the interventions can be constructed in a way that make the population
more likely to choose the healthier option without deploying mandates. One of
the chief challenges, of course, associated with employing these interventions is
avoiding causing a backlash due to their coercive nature, something that has
been common in health law and policy.261 Indeed, mandates engender
opposition.262
Constructed with the important goal of encouraging citizens or employers
to make healthier decisions, recent examples of health interventions include
restaurant calorie counts, employer wellness bonuses, and city soda taxes. While
these interventions may have some of the hallmarks of a hard mandate, they do
not interfere with the ultimate actor’s ability to make a decision. Instead, these
interventions seek to change incentives for the decision-makers, pushing, or
nudging, them to make decisions that result in better health outcomes, while also
producing monetary savings for the employer or city. For sure, their overall
effectiveness is not assured because they still are dependent upon the end user’s
decision.
In fact, their general effectiveness is still debated. Notably, how
interventions are framed, whether as a gain or loss, have been shown to not make
a difference in behavior.263 Nonetheless, it appears that imposing penalties for
undesirable behavior—an example of which would be soda taxes—may be more
effective than the information-ensuring calorie counts or voluntary employer
wellness incentives. Each is summarized in turn below.
Calorie Counts. In the spirit of providing more information to
consumers,264 and required by the ACA for restaurants with twenty or more
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260. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Matjasko et al., Applying Behavioral Economics to Public Health Policy, 50 AM.
J. PREVENTIVE MED. S13, S13 (2016).
261. See Garber, supra note 259, at 35–36.
262. See Margot Sanger-Katz, Obamacare’s Insurance Mandate Is Unpopular. So Why Not Just Get Rid of
It?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/upshot/obamacares-insurance-mandateis-unpopular-so-why-not-just-get-rid-of-it.html (“In a bill with many unloved parts, the Affordable Care Act’s
individual mandate has long been the most loathed.”); see also Zachary Tracer, The Individual Mandate,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2017, 12:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/individual-mandate (noting the
mandate as the “least popular part of the Affordable Care Act”).
263. See Gal, supra note 247.
264. See Maggie Fox, Restaurant Menu Label Rules Go into Effect, NBC NEWS,
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/restaurant-menu-label-rules-go-effect-n872066 (last updated
May 8, 2018, 7:39 PM).
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locations,265 publishing menu calorie counts seeks to push consumers to make
healthier choices in restaurants.266 But because they are voluntarily employed by
consumers, and there are no immediately ascertainable impacts for relying on
them or not in making decisions, their effectiveness may be limited. Past
experiences have been illuminating.
After New York City deployed the counts, customers “reported that they
saw and used calorie counts more often than people did in restaurants without
labels,” but, as the years wore on, “fewer and fewer people reported noticing
them or considering them,” and eventually ignored them.267 Other studies have
concluded that although individuals noticed the counts and they resulted in
“increased nutrition information awareness,” it did not ultimately change
ordering decisions.268 Another systematic review concluded that “over all, menu
labeling did not produce any significant changes in what people ordered.”269
Employer Wellness Programs. Employer wellness programs reward
employees—typically financially—who adopt healthier behaviors and/or make
healthier decisions.270 Reports on whether they are successful are also mixed.271
Although it seems as though financial incentives would impact decision-making,
one recent study concluded that employees’ behaviors do not improve, and
employers do not achieve cost savings, as a result of such a program.272
Nonetheless, another study “found 25 percent lower sick leave, health plan,
workers’ compensation, and disability insurance costs among companies that
had wellness programs.”273
Still another study “found an average annual health care cost increase of
1–2% for companies with wellness programs, compared to the 7% national
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265. Id.
266. See Aaron E. Carroll, The Failure of Calorie Counts on Menus, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/upshot/more-menus-have-calorie-labeling-but-obesity-rate-remainshigh.html.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See Darla Mercado, It May Sound Crazy, but Employees Are Leaving Money on the Table at Work,
CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/28/why-youre-leaving-money-on-the-table-at-work.html (last updated
Nov. 28, 2018, 3:35 PM), (noting that wellness programs enable the employee to earn small bonuses for signing
up and fulfilling the challenge); see also Kaiser Offers Cash Bonuses in Employee Wellness Program, BECKER’S
HOSP. REV. (Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/human-capital-and-risk/kaiser-offerscash-bonuses-in-employee-wellness-program.html (“Kaiser Permanente and the 29 unions representing its
employees are offering up to $500 bonuses to groups of workers who lose weight, lower their blood pressure,
stop smoking and lower their cholesterol levels.”).
271. See Aaron E. Carroll, Workplace Wellness Programs Don’t Work Well. Why Some Studies Show
Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/06/upshot/employer-wellnessprograms-randomized-trials.html (noting the limitations and challenges involved in observational studies that
review the effectiveness of wellness programs).
272. See Rebecca Greenfield, Workplace Wellness Programs Really Don’t Work, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26,
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-26/workplace-wellness-programs-really-don-t-work
(“Their study found that wellness programs—even those with incentives—don’t change employees’ behavior
much.”).
273. Holly Lebowitz Rossi, 5 Hallmarks of Successful Corporate Wellness Programs, FORTUNE (Apr. 13,
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/04/13/corporate-wellness/.
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average.”274 Observational studies on such programs demonstrate that wellness
programs can be plagued with limited value.275 Notwithstanding the
effectiveness of the wellness programs, they are increasingly popular across the
country.276
Soda Taxes. Soda taxes have also proliferated across the United States,
including a prominent and successful soda tax deployed by the city of
Philadelphia.277 Upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2018,278
Philadelphia’s soda taxes—which impose a 1.5 cent per ounce tax on sweetened
beverages—have succeeded in shrinking soda consumption rates.279 Early
studies have shown that “Philadelphians are about 40 percent less likely than
residents of three nearby cities to have a soda every day.”280 In addition to
positive health impacts, the tax funds a pre-kindergarten program in the city.281
And it has enjoyed popular support: in late 2016, three months before the tax
took effect, 54% of Philadelphia’s residents polled supported the tax, with 42%
opposed.282
But reports from Philadelphia have not been all positive. Critics have
suggested that the city is not raising as much revenue as anticipated,283 as
revenue from the program pulled in about $80 million for the city in its first
year.284 In another example, Chicago repealed its soda tax after it generated
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274. Id.
275. See Carroll, supra note 266.
276. See Kerry Hannon, Why Workplace Financial Wellness Programs Are Hot, FORBES (May 18, 2017,
11:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2017/05/18/why-workplace-financial-wellnessprograms-are-hot/#410e432813f8 (noting the increasing percentage of employers utilizing wellness benefits).
277. See Claire Sasko, The Soda Tax Has Had a Huge Impact on Philly’s Soda-Drinking Habits, Suggests
New Study, PHILA. MAG. (Apr. 13, 2018, 10:12 AM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2018/04/13/
philadelphia-soda-tax-people-drinking-less-soda/ (noting the tax has “significantly decreased soda consumption
in the city”).
278. See John Bacon, Push for Soda Taxes Across USA Notches Win in Philly, USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/07/18/philly-soda-tax-survives-courtchallenge/796104002/ (last updated July 18, 2018, 5:54 PM).
279. See Sasko, supra note 277 (“Here are the conclusions . . . ‘Within the first 2 months of tax
implementation, relative to the comparison cities, in Philadelphia the odds of daily consumption of regular soda
was 40% lower; energy drink was 64% lower; bottled water was 58% higher; and the 30-day regular soda
consumption frequency was 38% lower.’”).
280. Alan Mozes, Philly’s Soda Tax Is Working, Study Finds, WEBMD (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://www.webmd.com/diet/news/20180412/phillys-soda-tax-is-working-study-finds#1.
281. See Justin Udo, Soda Tax Dollars Finally Freed Up for Kenney’s Big Pre-K Push, KYW NEWSRADIO
(Aug. 2, 2018, 5:05 PM), https://kywnewsradio.radio.com/articles/news/soda-tax-dollars-finally-freed-mayorjim-kenneys-free-pre-k-initiative.
282. See Larry Eichel, Pew Poll Shows Philadelphians Feeling Good About Their City, PEW (Oct. 5, 2016),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2016/10/05/pew-poll-shows-philadelphiansfeeling-good-about-their-city.
283. See Angelica LaVito, Philadelphia’s Soda Tax Isn’t the Windfall Some Had Hoped for, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/22/philadelphias-soda-tax-isnt-the-windfall-some-had-hoped-for.html
(last
updated Aug. 23, 2017, 4:37 PM) (noting that the tax revenue was $39 million, short of the projection of $46
million).
284. See Alison Burdo, First Full Year of Soda Tax Revenue Puts City $13M+ Short of Goal, PHILA. BUS.
J. (Jan. 26, 2018, 8:23 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2018/01/26/philly-beverage-tax-
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significant controversy.285 Further, the target of food taxes may be broadening.
Other penalties that seek to limit consumption of unhealthy foods and
environmental harm—like “meat taxes”—may be on the horizon.286
2.

Organizations and Physicians: Value Payments
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The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), a voluntary incentivebased reimbursement program, is a component part of the ACA.287 This program
seeks to reward care administered that is reflective of high quality, highly
efficient care.288 Most basically, “the MSSP enables provider organizations to
share a percentage of the savings they achieve in delivering services to Medicare
beneficiaries, provided they meet quality performance standards.”289 This is
accomplished through pushing providers and entities into creating new
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), where the new organization is “held
accountable for the quality, cost, and experience of care of an assigned Medicare
fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiary population.”290 Coordinating care in this way
is intended to push providers to be more cognizant of the cost of certain care
delivery, while, at the same time, improving quality by “avoiding unnecessary
duplication” and “preventing medical errors.”291
These new payment structures flip the old incentives of fee-for-service
medicine on their heads, enticing organizations to deliver care that is highquality and efficient.292 After all, if the ACO achieves quality and efficiency
benchmarks, “the ACO will share in the savings it achieves for the Medicare
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soda-tax-pbt-2017-year-revenue.html (noting that the yield from December 2017 was an uptick from the
previous month, and the city pulled in about $80 million in the first twelve months of the program).
285. See Bernard Ellouk, Seattle’s New Tax on Sugary Drinks Kicks in Jan. 1, KING 5 NEWS (Dec. 29, 2017,
7:05 PM), https://www.king5.com/article/news/local/seattle/seattles-new-tax-on-sugary-drinks-kicks-in-jan1/281-501869514.
286. See James Hamblin, Here Comes the Meat Tax, ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/12/should-meat-cost-more-than-gold/548264/.
287. See Michael J. Montgomery, Note, Coordination or Consolidation? Accountable Care Organizations
and Antitrust Policy Under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1119, 1121–22 (2016)
(“By offering financial incentives to cut costs and achieve quality benchmarks in the treatment of Medicare
beneficiaries, ACOs under the MSSP promote provider accountability and move health care payment and
delivery toward a more cost-efficient model that provides higher quality care.”).
288. See Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and
Competition Policy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 3 (2014).
289. Id. at 4.
290. About
the
Program,
CTRS.
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/about.html
(last
updated June 3, 2019, 12:27 PM).
291. Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/index.html (last updated Mar. 8,
2019, 2:48 PM).
292. See Alan L. Hillman, Commentary, Managing the Physician: Rules Versus Incentives, 10 HEALTH AFF.
138, 138 (1991), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.10.4.138.
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program.”293 This would reverse years of incentives that encourage providers to
increase billing.294
Early reports regarding their effectiveness were mixed.295 More recent
reports raised the likelihood of prospective turbulence for the program, with
many ACOs considering leaving the program,296 and proposed CMS changes to
the ACO structure potentially on the horizon.297 Nonetheless, some of the
changes may not ultimately impact ACO participation.298
A larger goal of the program is its hope to “leverage[e] Medicare policy to
transform health delivery and payment practices in the private sector.”299
Mirroring the value-based movement, Medicare—through the MSSP—is
seeking to incentivize hospitals to administer services that are more beneficial
to both its beneficiaries and the fiscal health of the program itself.300 In this way,
the structural frame has been constructed to push entities and providers to care
more about efficiencies and quality metrics—something that previously, in the
Medicare program, has been an underappreciated concern.301
Value-based purchasing has also come to Medicare Part B.302 Under the
Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), which was created under the
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015,303 physicians who
participate in Medicare Part B and who are not enrolled in an alternative
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293. Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), supra note 291.
294. See Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 101 GEO. L.J. 519,
542 (2013).
295. See David Muhlestein, Medicare ACOs: Mixed Initial Results and Cautious Optimism, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20140204.036921/full/ (“Of the 114
ACOs in the program, only 54 of the ACOs saved money and only 29 of those saved enough money to receive
bonus payments.”).
296. See Virgil Dickson, Heading for the Exit: Rather than Face Risk, Many ACOs Could Leave, MOD.
HEALTHCARE
(May
12,
2018,
1:00
AM),
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180512/NEWS/180519966.
297. See Susan Morse, Lawmakers Ask CMS to Reconsider ACO MSSP Overhaul, HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS
(Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/lawmakers-ask-cms-reconsider-aco-msspoverhaul.
298. See Virgil Dickson, ACOs to Stay in Shared-Savings Program Despite Downside Risk, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Oct. 17, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20181017/
TRANSFORMATION04/181019904.
299. Greaney, supra note 288, at 4.
300. See Robert Mechanic & Clifton Gaus, Medicare Shared Savings Program Produces Substantial
Savings: New Policies Should Promote ACO Growth, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180906.711463/full/ (“According to CMS, MSSP ACOs
saved $1.1 billion in 2017, with net savings of $314 million after accounting for shared savings payments earned
by ACOs.”).
301. See Bagley, supra note 294, at 542 (noting that the Sustainable Growth Rate formula (SGR) that did
not effectively pressure physicians to care about cost “has proven ineffective”).
302. See MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM IN THE QUALITY PAYMENT PROGRAM, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (2016), https://qpp-cm-prod-content.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/191/APMsin-The-Quality-Payment-Program-for-Shared-Savings-Program-SSP-webinar-slides.pdf.
303. See
What’s
MACRA,
CTRS.
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/Value-BasedPrograms/MACRA-MIPS-and-APMs/MACRA-MIPS-and-APMs.html (last updated June 14, 2019, 8:19 AM).
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payment model (APM)304 are measured on four separate metrics—quality,
resource use/cost, clinical practice improvement activities, and advancing care
information.305 Participation is mandatory for providers who are not enrolled in
an APM, with exceptions.306 Again, mirroring the MSSP, providers within MIPS
are financially encouraged to be mindful of delivery efficiency, increasing
reimbursement by providing high quality care at a lower cost.307 The resource
use criterion directly measures a provider’s efficiency. Nonetheless, challenges
to the MIPS program are likely forthcoming from the Trump administration.308
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IV. COST-CONSCIOUS MARKET ARCHITECTURE
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In seeking to leave room for private market actors within the individual
health insurance exchanges, the ACA adopted a model that is not unfamiliar to
the history of American health law and policy: an unwavering commitment to
the private market’s ability to provide health insurance, but an accompaniment
of substantial government-imposed regulatory guardrails. The ACA
supercharged this model in that it lured private insurance companies into a
previously unprofitable market (made profitable by generous subsidies) while
building up the regulatory scaffolding that surrounded it. It paid private
insurance companies to participate while mandating that they sell insurance to
citizens with health risks they would have never previously accepted.
Participation remains voluntary.
But by relying on the voluntary action of private entities—with markedly
different goals than the government—to deliver health insurance to the market’s
customers, the scheme failed to adequately take account of conflicts of interest
that naturally occur within the market. With weak market-based pressures, and
devoid of regulations that sufficiently incentivize the insurance companies to
limit their premium increases, the federal government—and the market’s
patient-beneficiaries—are simply along for the ride. This is the case, even
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304. See APMs Overview, Quality Payment Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://qpp.cms.gov/apms/overview (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
305. See MIPS Scoring Methodology Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://qpp-cmprod-content.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/179/2018%20MIPS%20Scoring%20Guide_Final.pdf (last visited
Jan. 24, 2020).
306. See How MIPS Eligibility Is Determined, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://qpp.cms.gov/participation-lookup/about (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (noting that providers who participate
in an alternative payment model (APM) are exempt from MIPS).
307. See MIPS Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://qpp.cms.gov/mips/overview
(last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (“MIPS was designed to tie payments to quality and cost efficient care, drive
improvement in care processes and health outcomes, increase the use of healthcare information, and reduce the
cost of care.”).
308. See Steven Porter, Expect Big MIPS Changes Under 2019 Quality-Reporting Proposals, HEALTH
LEADERS MEDIA (July 16, 2018), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/welcome-ad?toURL=/clinicalcare/expect-big-mips-changes-under-2019-quality-reporting-proposals; see also Joanne Finnegan, A Break for
Doctors: Trump Administration Wants to Reduce Reporting Burden Under MIPS, FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Feb.
22, 2018, 11:51 AM), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/practices/trump-budget-mips-quality-reporting-macra.
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though fraud enforcement,309 as well as fiduciary regulation,310 could be brought
to bear in an attempt to better neutralize these conflicts of interest.311
In other realms of health law, policy interventions based on softer
incentives have been deployed for employees, restaurant visitors, soda lovers,
physicians who participate in Medicare Part B, and hospitals and clinics that
form ACOs. In an effort to increase enrollment on the individual market, other
creative ideas—those directed toward insurance beneficiaries—have also been
suggested.312 Although a good idea from a risk-spreading perspective in that the
increased enrollment causes premiums to drop for all beneficiaries, solutions
directed toward beneficiaries’ enrollment decisions do not impact the price of
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309. Congress made clear that the Federal Civil False Claims Act (FCA) applies to the health insurance
exchanges and the individual marketplace. See 42 U.S.C. § 18033(a)(6)(A) (2018) (“Payments made by,
through, or in connection with an Exchange are subject to the False Claims Act if those payments include any
Federal funds.” (citation omitted)). Mirroring other areas of health law fraud and abuse enforcement, the FCA
could be employed to provide additional incentives for insurance companies to limit rate increases. Mirroring
cases where federal prosecutors apply the FCA to “outlier” providers who cost the federal health care programs
excessive amounts of money—at least when compared to peers—the FCA could be wielded in a similar manner.
310. Legal precedent and scholarship recognize the importance of agency law—and particularly, duties
belonging to agents and principals—in an effort to prevent the development of a damaging conflict of interest
in certain legal relationships. In corporate law, legally-enforceable duties—most prominently illustrated by the
duty of loyalty that directors owe shareholders—protect the sanctity of sensitive relationships. Within health law
scholarship, scholars have argued for at least a limited recognition of a fiduciary regime in different contexts.
These include an imposition (1) on the patient-provider relationship as a patient-protective tool, (2) on the
hospital-discharged patient relationship to prevent harm, and (3) on the Medicare-provider relationship as a costsavings tool, to name a few. See Isaac D. Buck, Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duty of Providers to
the Payers of Medicare, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2016); Thomas L. Hafemeister & Joshua Hinckley
Porter, Don’t Let Go of the Rope: Reducing Readmissions by Recognizing Hospitals’ Fiduciary Duties to Their
Discharged Patients, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 513, 514 (2013); Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me:
A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167,
1170 (2009); Dayna Bowen Matthew, Implementing American Health Care Reform: The Fiduciary Imperative,
59 BUFF. L. REV. 715, 726 (2011); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why Physicians Are Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 2 (2015); Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s
Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 457 (2000) (noting the recognition of the
patient-provider relationship, albeit a limited one). All of these proposals extend the relationship-based corporate
law paradigm—and particularly, the duty of loyalty—to key interactions particularly dependent on trust within
health law in an effort to protect more vulnerable parties and the trust upon which their efficiency-enhancing
relationship is based.
311. See sources cited supra note 310. Those same arguments—that focus on promoting and protecting
loyalty between separate parties within health law—can be extended to the ACA’s individual marketplace and
may provide a worthwhile frame for addressing the conflict threat on the individual marketplace. Specifically,
reading in a protectable agency relationship would impose a higher duty of trust and loyalty on insurance
companies tasked with providing insurance to ACA beneficiaries on the exchanges. This paradigm is applicable,
not because private insurance companies and the government are required to cooperate to effectuate health
insurance delivery to marketplace customers, but because, in effect, the federal government has enlisted the
private insurance company to carry out the government’s goal of providing insurance for its previouslyuninsurable population. In this way, the relationship classically resembles the principal-agent relationship. In
this structure, the private insurance company becomes an agent of the federal government. The application of
fiduciary duties becomes natural.
312. See Susannah Luthi, Democratic Lawmaker Eyes Partial Auto-Enrollment as Way Forward for ACA,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 27, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20180427/NEWS/180429909.
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American health care in the way that an intervention targeted at insurance
companies would.
Nonetheless, the ACA’s subsidies could be restructured to operate on the
beneficiaries in a more direct manner. As mentioned above, the ACA’s tax
subsidies are keyed to one’s household income.313 This creates unnatural
incentives for individuals who want to avoid pay raises, concerned about how
that may impact their subsidy amount.314 And, as also mentioned above, the
subsidy structure’s fragmented cliffs may prevent individuals from wanting to
experience household income raises altogether.315 Mirroring recent public health
interventions, this construction—leaving subsidies to be determined solely by
household income, not by socially beneficial behavior—missed an opportunity
to reward “good citizens,” which would have allowed individuals who make
healthy choices to receive higher government subsidy amounts. The
beneficiary’s agency—and their socially beneficial decisions—could be directly
(and financially) rewarded.
Other supplemental regulatory changes that hold down the cost of care for
individual beneficiaries—albeit ones that may be less successful in affecting the
baseline cost of care—could be employed. Drawing on scholarship examining
the right amount of “skin in the game” to prevent the documented problem of
moral hazard,316 perhaps additional new regulations could limit deductibles to a
percentage of one’s income. This would alleviate the problem of individuals
feeling as though their deductibles are so expensive that they cannot afford to
even access health care—the same care their expensive insurance plans
seemingly guarantee.
But using the same theoretical mechanisms, there is no reason to keep
similar interventions from being unleashed in the ACA marketplace beyond
beneficiaries, but also to work on insurance companies as well. Insurance
companies are the actors in the most powerful position to impact the cost of
insurance, largely because of the extensive leverage they enjoy. What is striking
is the absence of well-calibrated soft incentives—that are responsibly geared to
impacting the behavior of insurance companies on the ACA’s exchanges—that
are a missed opportunity to shape behavior.
Indeed, the subsidy structure could have been wholly restructured in a way
to incentivize and nudge insurance companies themselves—the actors that are
seeking year-over-year premium hikes—to neutralize some of the worst
conflicts of interest on the market. Relying on behavioral economics literature,
the subsidies could have been calibrated to seek to influence the behavior of
insurance companies that would have made the decision to raise premiums
costlier for the insurance companies themselves. This would have the upside of
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313. See supra notes 189–197 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 189–197 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 189–197 and accompanying text.
316. See Pauline Bartolone, When High Deductibles Cause Even Insured Patients to Postpone Care, CNN
(Aug. 5, 2017, 10:13 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/08/05/news/economy/high-deductibles-insured-healthcare/index.html; Robertson, supra note 237, at 239.
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not only making health insurance more affordable but would also sharpen an
incentive that—in the current ACA market—is too dull: this would pressure
insurance companies to seek additional discounts from health care providers,
including both hospitals and physicians.
Instead of just paying based on a beneficiary’s household income, the
federal government could have structured the subsidies in a way that encouraged
and incentivized insurance companies to set prices lower. For example, the
federal government could have imposed a “tiered” subsidy plan with its subsidy
payments, so as to reward efficient insurance companies by paying larger
subsidies to those who hold down premium increases year over year. This could
be accomplished through either paying direct subsidies to the most efficient
insurance companies, or by using the beneficiaries as indirect conduits. This
structure would seek to steer beneficiaries—through rewards with tax
subsidies—toward more efficient and cost-conscious insurance companies.
To accomplish this, beneficiaries who select a particular plan—one that
was quite efficiently priced—could be rewarded with higher subsidies. If a
consumer is paid more money for choosing a more cost-conscious plan, more
consumers would be pushed to purchase the plans sold by the cost-conscious
insurance company. As a result, persistently expensive insurance plans may face
the cold reality of shrinking market share.
Assuming the subsidy gain was sufficient, this arrangement would push
insurance companies that sell plans on the individual marketplace to spend more
of their focus on holding down annual premium amounts, providing a powerful
counterweight to the pressure they feel to continue to raise premiums. The key
function of this new arrangement would be to encourage insurance companies
to think harder when setting premium amounts for the marketplace’s following
year. This would also push insurance companies to drive aggressive negotiations
with providers and hospitals, providing another, more potent tool to push the
“sellers” of American health care to lower their prices on the front end.
As an alternative to the subsidy structure, the payments could instead be
structured as a tax—similar to the soda taxes deployed in Philadelphia—that
would penalize insurance companies that seek the highest percentage of
premium increases. Or they could be structured like an incentive payment that
mirrors the MSSP—insurance companies that achieve cost savings, or at least
limit health care premiums the most, could be rewarded with higher subsidy
payments from the federal government (or indirectly, through subsidies
originally given to beneficiaries). However structured, this new mechanism
would evince a clear policy choice for those insurance plans that operate in a
leaner way.
A secondary goal would surely follow. Pressed to limit premium increases
so as to increase subsidy amounts, insurance companies would approach
network negotiations with hospitals and physicians in a more powerful position.
Currently blunted from fighting health care price increases too strongly by the
MLR and other market failures, the new subsidy architecture would make the
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insurance company that saves its beneficiaries more money, more profitable.
Like physicians participating in Medicare’s Shared Savings Program, the federal
government would be sharing savings with insurance companies on the
exchange, literally paying carriers to operate with cost efficiency at front of
mind.
Whatever policy solution is ultimately furthered, market subsidies could be
creatively restructured in a way that more clearly address the worst inefficiencies
of the individual marketplaces that have struggled to survive. Employing
important lessons from behavioral economics—meant to encourage these actors
on the ACA exchanges into making more pro-social business decisions—could
provide a guiding platform for powerful changes to the marketplaces. The
counterweight could effectively insulate more Americans from the worst costs
of American health care.
Although the thrust of this proposal—to build-in and instantiate societallybeneficial price pressures in the insurance markets—contemplates the injection
of corrective incentives, there are limits of the proposal that are worth
mentioning. The biggest challenge to the proposal is that it would have to be
implemented by states or the federal government in the insurance marketplaces
they run.317 The likelihood of the states and federal government—given the
political volatility of the ACA markets and the inner-workings of the law—
seems relatively low at this point. State actors have been hesitant to touch the
ACA, largely for reasons related to politics. Nonetheless, more states seem
interested in stepping up to address some of the worst of the market’s
inefficiencies, often providing a corrective to federal government policies that
have damaged the health of the private ACA marketplaces.318
But, assuming implementation, the other major challenge revolves around
adequately calibrating the shared savings subsidies. Should the subsidies be too
meager, they would be unlikely to sufficiently impact insurance companies’
behavior. Should the subsidies be too great, insurance companies may cut too
many health care services from their required coverages. To the extent that ACA
regulations on essential health benefits are enforced, this would help to prevent
this problem.319 Still, cost-cutting could result in more narrow networks for
beneficiaries, frustrating their efforts to see a specialist or specific provider. A
key consideration here would be to ensure the subsidies are neither too cold nor

Pr

ep

rin

317. Currently, twenty-six marketplaces are completely run by the federal government. See Louise Norris,
What Type of Health Insurance Exchange Does My State Have?, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Oct. 9, 2019),
https://www.healthinsurance.org/faqs/what-type-of-health-insurance-exchange-does-my-state-have/.
318. See Meredith Cohn, Lawmakers Seek to Create State Mandate to Push More Marylanders into Health
Insurance, BALT. SUN (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hs-aca-individual-mandate20181113-story.html; Katie Keith, New Jersey Becomes Second State to Adopt Individual Mandate; Ohio
Attempt
to
Waive
Mandate
Rejected,
HEALTH
AFF.
BLOG
(June
1,
2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180601.345116/full/.
319. Quick Take: Essential Health Benefits: What Have States Decided for Their Benchmark?, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Dec. 7, 2012), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/quick-take-essential-health-benefits-whathave-states-decided-for-their-benchmark/.
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too hot—a lesson learned through trial and error during an important
implementation period.
A final challenge to successful implementation would be participation. It
is not hard to imagine a scenario in which no insurance company elects to restrict
its costs to achieve subsidies. For instance, if no insurance company decides to
be impacted by the subsidy arrangement—recognizing such an arrangement is
strictly voluntary—there is nothing that would require them to enroll in such a
program. Nonetheless, the profit pressure—as well as pressure from its
shareholders to generate increasing profits—may push companies into
participating in a shared savings program.
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That the ACA is both still substantially intact and remains under existential
threat illustrates both its striking resiliency and the proximity of peril. Its
strengths and weaknesses track a dichotomous history within American health
care. Indeed, for generations, Americans have been skeptical of government
involvement, but uncomfortable with relying on the cold reality of the market.
Besides distorting and constricting the development of American health care law
and policy, these conflicting beliefs have resulted in both a bloated and underregulated non-system, one that continues—even after the ACA—to prove its
unworkability for millions of Americans. Citizens now have access to insurance,
but the cost of care remains an insufficiently addressed challenge.
Seen by some as a turn away from the chaotic decades that proceeded it,
the ACA did not sufficiently account for America’s cost crisis. Its individual
marketplace—hampered by a lack of competition—continues to struggle. But
new ideas from behavioral economics, deployed in other areas within health law
itself, could be brought to bear in an effort to bring down the cost of insurance,
providing a powerful counterweight to the conflicts of interest that continue to
incentivize insurance companies to operate at cross-purposes with a desire to
bring down the costs within the system. These changes could put the ACA on
more secure political footing and, most importantly, may prove an effective tool
in working toward finally reining in the cost of American health care.
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